Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction by Muir, Dana & Stein, Norman
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 93 | Number 2 Article 4
1-1-2015
Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of
the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction
Dana Muir
Norman Stein
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. Rev.
459 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol93/iss2/4
TWO HATS, ONE HEAD, NO HEART: THE
ANATOMY OF THE ERISA
SETTLOR/FIDUCIARY DISTINCTION*
DANA MUIR & NORMAN STEIN*
Congress enacted ERISA, the comprehensive employee benefits
reform statute, in 1974. ERISA created a strict fiduciary standard
for those involved in the administration or management of
employee benefit plans or their assets, a standard that requires
such actors to make decisions solely in the interests of the plan's
participants and their beneficiaries. The Department of Labor
and the federal courts, however, have held that employer
decisions on whether to adopt or terminate a plan, or how to
design the provisions of a plan, are plan "settlor" functions, akin
to a grantor's design of a trust under the common law, and thus
not subject to ERISA's fiduciary duties. Courts have used this
distinction between "settlor" and "fiduciary" functions to
recognize the employer's own interests in employee benefit plans
and to mediate between those interests and the statute's command
that plan decisions be made in the exclusive interest of the plan's
participants.
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The Department of Labor based its version of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine on a quasi-common-law notion
concerning the voluntary nature of plan sponsorship under
ERISA and the legitimacy of an employer considering its own
interests in designing a plan's provisions in a voluntary system.
The Supreme Court, however, based its version of the doctrine
on a narrow reading of ERISA's statutory definition of plan
fiduciary, under which a person is unfettered by fiduciary
concerns when it amends a plan or implements specific language
in the plan. Thus, for the Supreme Court, the determination of
whether fiduciary considerations apply to an administrative
action is a mechanical test: they do not if the action is either the
drafting of a plan provision or the implementation of a plan
provision.
This Article shows that the Supreme Court's settlor/fiduciary
doctrine has become the central theme in ERISA jurisprudence.
While the doctrine has worked well and is not controversial in
routine cases, the Article shows that the doctrine has permitted
employers in some cases to bypass express and implied ERISA
requirements through artful plan drafting and, perhaps more
troubling, has also permitted employers to exploit ERISA's
broad preemption of state law to insulate plans' actions from
judicial or state legislative oversight, even in areas where there is
broad national consensus, such as limits on claim subrogation
and liability for negligent medical decision making. The Article
argues that while the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has made it
relatively easy for courts to decide cases, it has resulted and will
continue to result in decisions that are unmoored from the policy
considerations that animated Congress in enacting ERISA,
considerations that in our view should anchor ERISA
jurisprudence. The Article concludes by suggesting three limiting
principles that courts could use to provide a more nuanced
approach- to balancing employer and employee interests in and
related to ERISA plans. These principles would leave intact the
core of the doctrine while mitigating its most troubling effects.
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INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")' celebrates its fortieth birthday this year and now totters
on the brink of what would be middle age for a person and what one
would hope would be maturity for a statute. But it was during
ERISA's adolescence that Professors Daniel Fischel and John
Langbein detected a fundamental fissure in its statutory geography':
the exclusive benefit rule of section 404(a).1 Borrowed from trust law
and forming both the centerpiece and core of ERISA's first title,
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule unyieldingly commands employee
benefit plan fiduciaries to discharge their duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the plan's participants and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to them and their beneficiaries. Fischel
and Langbein told us that these straightforward injunctions deny the
essential nature of employee benefit plans in which the plan sponsors
and the plan participants share the plan's beneficial interest (and also
share in the settlement of the trust vehicle).' Although their article
influenced scholarly understanding of an important statutory
problem, the problems they raised have not been directly engaged by
the federal courts or the federal regulatory agencies that administer
ERISA. In legal scholarship, their article is among the most cited of
all ERISA articles, but the article has rarely been discussed in the
courts and never by the Supreme Court.'
But this is not to say that the courts and agencies have ignored
the tensions that run along this statutory fault line, particularly with
respect to the "beneficial" interests of the employer in employee
benefit plans. And perhaps the most important of the mediating tools
that judges and the agencies have used to recognize the employer's
interests is the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.' The doctrine delineates
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 90-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012)).
2. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105,1108-10 (1988).
3. ERISA § 404(a).
4. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1108-10.
5. Id. at 1118.
6. Federal courts have occasionally cited to the article, but only one judicial opinion
has directly engaged the article's central point. See Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 639 F. Supp. 2d
1074, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009), affid, 729 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 43
(2014).
7. See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text; see also Dana M. Muir, The Plan
Amendment Trilogy: Settling the Scope of the Settlor Doctrine, 15 LAB. LAw. 205, 205-06
(1999) (examining a trilogy of Supreme Court cases in which employers are empowered to
amend retirement/benefit plans freely).
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plan sponsor decisions into two distinct types: (1) decisions that are
made in a fiduciary capacity and thus are subject to ERISA's
fiduciary requirements, including the exclusive benefit rule; and (2)
decisions that are made in a "settlor" or other business capacity and
are thus unconstrained by the statute's fiduciary paradigm.' The
metaphor courts have used to describe this distinction is millinery in
nature: a plan sponsor might be wearing a fiduciary hat or might be
wearing a settlor hat.' And as we will show, a fiduciary can, like Dr.
Seuss's Bartholomew Cubbins, 0 sometimes wear multiple hats and
may have more than two hats in its wardrobe."
As we will explain below, the Supreme Court's
"settlor/fiduciary" doctrine relies on an interpretation of the actual
statutory language defining fiduciary," while the Department of
Labor's ("DOL" or "Department") original version of the doctrine
relied on the more ethereal notion that the statute must be applied in
the context of the voluntariness of the employee benefit plans that the
statute regulates." The Supreme Court's reading of the statutory
language, which was plausible but not compelled by the statute's
8. See Muir, supra note 7, at 205-06.
9. Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir.
2003) ("Accordingly, a plan sponsor is entitled to wear different hats: it may perform some
functions as a fiduciary to the plan, while it may perform other functions on its own behalf,
i.e., in a non-fiduciary capacity."); Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 718 (6th Cir.
2000) ("We have recognized that employers who are also plan sponsors wear two hats: one
as fiduciary ... and the other as employer performing settlor functions . .. ."); Bennett v.
Conrail Matched Say. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671, 679 (3d Cir. 1999) ("ERISA
permits employers to 'wear "two hats," ' one as plan administrator, the other as plan
sponsor."); Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1995) ("It is therefore perfectly
consistent for an employer to wear 'two hats' and act both as a fiduciary and as an
employer without breaching fiduciary duties.").
10. DR. SEUss, THE 500 HATS OF BARTHOLOMEW CUBBINS (1938). In celebration of
the seventy-fifth anniversary of the book's publication, Random House and Dr. Seuss
Enterprises are sponsoring a traveling exhibition of Dr. Seuss's extensive collection of
hats. Leslie Kaufman, The Author Himself Was a Cat in the Hat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2013, at Cl (book review).
[T]he real Dr. Seuss, Theodor Seuss Geisel, was a hat lover himself. He collected
hundreds of them, plumed, beribboned and spiked, and kept them in a closet
hidden behind a bookcase in his home in the La Jolla section of San Diego. He
incorporated them into his personal paintings, his advertising work and his books.
He even insisted that guests to his home don the most elaborate ones he could
find.
Id.
11. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 197-98 (explicitly referring to multiple
hats).
12. See infra text accompanying note 96.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
actual words, unfortunately leaves courts only marginal flexibility to
rein in some of the serious problems that we argue have resulted and
will in the future likely result from the application of what has
become a formalistic and mechanically applied rule. Indeed, the
ultimate point of this Article is that while the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine has made it relatively easy for courts to decide cases, it has
resulted and will continue to result in .decisions that are unmoored
from the nuanced policy considerations that animated Congress in
enacting ERISAl4 and in our view should anchor ERISA
jurisprudence.
So what are the problems? In broad terms, there are two, one of
which we just suggested: the settlor/fiduciary doctrine ignores policies
and concerns that should be balanced against the interests that the
doctrine advances, such as encouraging employers to adopt employee
plans in the first place and recognizing the economic interests that
employers have in employee benefit plans. Professors Fischel and
Langbein, after all, noted that the plan sponsor and plan participant
are both, in effect, settlors and beneficiaries of an employee benefit
plan and that benefits law should recognize that they share these
functions." The settlor/fiduciary doctrine implicitly recognizes the
employer's beneficial interest in plans but ignores the participant's
economic interest as the statutorily protected beneficiary of the
employer's promise, if not as co-settlor.16
The second concern is related to the first: the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine can allow employers to design plans to permit fiduciary
behavior that would be flatly impermissible if not expressly provided
by the plan's terms. An aspect of this concern is that, besides the
reputational effects that a plan sponsor might consider in deciding
how to act,17 there are few limitations on the doctrine's scope.
Indeed, the only unambiguous statutory constraints on an employer
exercising a settlor function are the minimum standards that ERISA
imposes on plan design." And once a plan is adopted, the fiduciary is
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1117.
16. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.1 (discussing how the doctrine is applied to unsettle
employee expectations).
17. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1132.
18. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.2 (discussing how the doctrine allows plans to undermine
ERISA's protective provisions).
19. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 5-1 to 5-115, 6-1 to 6-68 (Jeffrey Lewis et al. eds.,
2012). Many of the minimum requirements are mirrored in the Internal Revenue Code.
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obligated to follow the plan's terms ins6far as the terms of the plan
are consistent with the statute.20
But as we will show, this statutory brake on plan design-that the
plan cannot effectively license a fiduciary to do what the statute
prohibits-has not prevented plan sponsors from designing plans in
ways that arguably dilute the ERISA fiduciary duties of prudence and
loyalty2 1 or from creating plan-specific exceptions to some of
ERISA's prohibited transaction rules.22 Moreover, because of
ERISA's broad preemptive reach, the employer can design a plan to
accomplish harsh outcomes that would otherwise be prohibited by
law in virtually all fifty states, were never endorsed by Congress, and
arguably are antithetical to any coherent policy rationale. 23 And as
the employee benefits landscape (and the ingenuity of plan designers)
continues to evolve, these problems are likely to become more
salient, troubling, and intractable.24
Consider what happened to James McCutchen after he suffered
egregious injuries in a car accident that was the fault of another
driver. His health insurance paid almost $67,000 in medical costs but
that did not come close to compensating him for the more than one
million dollars in lost income and other damages he suffered.25 Mr.
McCutchen sued and eventually recovered $110,000 from his and the
other driver's automobile insurance (the policy maximums), leaving
Mr. McCutchen with $66,000 after attorney's fees. But after the
lawsuit, Mr. McCutchen's health plan demanded to be reimbursed-
from the $110,000 settlement-in full for the amount it had paid for
his medical costs. 2 6 This would have left Mr. McCutchen almost
$1,000 out-of-pocket ($66,000 - $67,000) simply because he brought
the tort suit in an attempt to recover some of his extensive damages.
Longstanding equitable doctrines in state insurance law safeguard
against that outcome, but the Supreme Court of the United States
held that employers, while wearing their settlor hat, may negate
application of those doctrines by including exclusionary language in
the plan.27
20. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012).
21. See infra Part III.A.2.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 401-09.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 295-304.
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. U.S. Airways v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1543 (2013).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1551.
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Mr. McCutchen's case is neither unique nor representative of the
broad array of problems we address in this Article. The
settlor/fiduciary doctrine, or variants on it, is relevant to a surprisingly
wide range of employee benefits contexts, including: use of defined
benefit ("DB") 2 8 plan assets, selection and management of defined
contribution ("DC")2 9 plan investment assets (including stock of the
employer), choice of medical providers and access to certain courses
of treatment in health care plans, review of claims denials and choice
of limitations periods, disclosures to plan participants, subrogation of
rights to insurance proceeds in health care plans, plan mergers and
spinoffs in corporate reorganizations, and employer interference with
a participant's attainment of benefits under a plan.' The wide range
of topics to which the doctrine has relevance is partly a reflection of
how changes in benefits law, benefits delivery, and benefits policy
have interacted with ERISA's fiduciary provisions." This process is
ongoing and the number of benefit issues-and, in some cases,
nonbenefit issues-affected by the doctrine is likely to increase over
time.
We have divided the remainder of this Article into four parts.
Part I traces the development of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine,
beginning with some discussion about the evolution of employee
benefits and their regulation. Part II explores some of the less
28. Defined benefit pension plans promise a lifetime stream of income, or its lump-
sum equivalent, to retirees. The amount of an employee's benefit frequently is based on
years of service and a salary calculation. The employer assumes the investment risk
because the employer must fund the plan sufficiently to pay the promised benefits. Dana
M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. REv. 201,
205-06 (1995).
29. Defined contribution benefit plans establish an account for each employee who
participates in the plan. Employees become entitled to whatever assets are in the account
at times established by the plan terms, frequently when they terminate employment or
reach a particular age. Employees assume the investment risk in these accounts. Id. at 205.
401(k) plans are the most widely used type of DC plan. See Retirement Assets Total $18.9
Trillion in First Quarter 2012, ICI GLOBAL (June 28, 2012), http://www.iciglobal.org/
portal/site/ICl/menuitem.905dc9f48cce5dfa30fc6010a52001ca/?vgnextoid=56c5056c25f2831
OVgnVCM1000005aO210acRCRD&vgnextchannel=a04317281ae3f 11OVgnVCM1000005b0
21OacRCRD&vgnextfmt=print (reporting 401(k) plans as holding more than $3.4 trillion).
30. See infra Part II.C (discussing these situations).
31. The settlor/fiduciary doctrine in ERISA can dilute employee rights in areas of law
beyond employee benefits. For example, in the second of a quintet of Supreme Court
cases on the doctrine, the Court permitted an employer to condition benefits on an
employee waiving a variety of rights under federal labor law and state labor and contract
law that were unrelated to the benefits in question. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S.
882, 888 (1996). The doctrine can also affect, for example, the viability of a state-law
malpractice claim against a physician or rights to proceeds from a tortfeasor in a state
court. See infra text accompanying notes 295-304,441-44.
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definitively evolved corners of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. It then
continues to reflect on the penumbras of the doctrine while also
cataloging the various benefits issues in which the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine has relevance. Part III critiques the doctrine in light of the
two broad concerns we identified above-that the policies it advances
should be balanced with those it negates and that it permits plan
sponsors to design plans in ways that undermine some of ERISA's
participant-protective provisions-keeping in mind the unanswered
questions explored in Part II. It also explains that the regulatory
vacuum created by ERISA's broad preemption provision precludes
the problems from being addressed at the state level. Part IV looks
forward and argues that either the courts need to develop limiting
principles on the doctrine's scope or Congress needs to consider
legislatively taming a doctrine that has the potential to spin out of
control. Because we believe congressional action is unlikely, we
suggest three limiting principles that courts might use to better assess
what hat an employer is wearing when taking action that affects its
benefit plan.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SETFLOR/FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE
This Part provides a history of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine as it
has developed in the federal courts and the federal agencies charged
with enforcement of employee benefits law. The Part begins with
what we hope will be some context-creating reflections about the
evolution of employee benefits law over the last century or so, with
special emphasis on ERISA and its purposes and goals. The Part then
turns to ERISA's debt to, and variations on, the common law of
trusts. We then provide an account of the administrative and judicial
creation of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.
A. A Brief History of the Regulation of Employee Benefit Plans
Employee benefit plans existed long before ERISA was a
sparkle in Congress's eyes. The conventional account of the
development of pension plans generally begins in 1875, when the
American Express Company adopted a retirement plan for its
2015] 467
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employees.32 Pension plans proliferated over the next fifty years, with
their growth ultimately truncated by the Great Depression."
There was, of course, no comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme regulating pensions or other employee benefit plans during
this first half century of employee benefit plans, although the
adoption of an income tax in 1916 necessitated the creation of a
framework for the taxation of the employer who sponsored an
employee benefit plan, the beneficiaries who participated in an
employee benefit plan, and the plan itself.' But other than the tax
laws, regulation of employee benefit plans was at the time left to the
states, 'where applicable legal principles crisscrossed such areas of
legal doctrine as trust law, contract law, employment law, and
insurance law.35 It should be said that employers typically included in
employee benefit plans "reservation of rights clauses," which
described the benefits under the plan as future gifts from, rather than
enforceable obligations against, the sponsoring employer.3 6 State
courts generally respected these clauses, which were described in one
early article on legal aspects of private pension plans as "weasel
clauses."3
Over the next half century, culminating in 1974 with the
enactment of ERISA, the law of employee benefits, and particularly
the law of private-sector pension plans, became increasingly
federalized. The reasons for this were manifold, complex, and
interrelated but included the expanding import of the federal income
32. MURRAY WEBB LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 21 (1933) (describing the first noncontributory industrial pension
plan); see also WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT 132-33 (1980).
33. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. SENATE,
SPECIAL COMMITIEE ON AGING, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1, 2 (1984). The account in this subpart relies heavily on Mr.
Gordon's chapter, to which he brought his personal in-depth knowledge of the history of
ERISA. In 1930, an author of an early text on the actuarial and legal aspects of pensions,
found a total of 413 "formal" industrial pension systems, concentrated in firms with large
numbers of employees. ARTHUR DAVID CLOUD, PENSIONS IN MODERN INDUSTRY 53-
54 (1930). In addition, a number of labor organizations sponsored their own pension plans
without direct employer involvement. MURRAY WEBB LATIMER, TRADE UNION
PENSION SYSTEMS 27-29 (1932).
34. See Gordon, supra note 33, at 2.
35. See, e.g., PAUL P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 171-90
(1959); CLOUD, supra note 33, at 113 (beginning to catalog cases). See generally Hurd v.
Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (reviewing various legal theories of
pensions).
36. See CLOUD, supra note 33, at 131-32.
37. Note, Legal Status of Private Industrial Pension Plans, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1375,
1379 (1940).
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tax and the concomitant value of employee benefit plans in tax
planning, the growing economic and social importance of employee
benefit plans nationally (especially retirement plans3 8), the
significance of employee benefit plans to the federally regulated
arena of labor and employment policy, and a developing federal
interest in consumer protection." Thus, beginning in the 1930s, the
nation saw increasingly detailed and sophisticated tax regulation of
employee benefit plans, regulation that had both tax-avoidance and
social-welfare policy aspects.' And in 1947, concerned about the
potentially enormous power of union-run pension plans, Congress
included in the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act)41 provisions curbing union domination of negotiated employee
benefit plans and expressly subjected the trustees of such plans to a
somewhat primitive federal fiduciary regime.42
By the 1950s, congressional hearings had identified serious
shortcomings with employee benefit plans, including mismanagement,
theft and other misuses of plan assets; excessive investment in
employer stock and debt; inadequate funding; and plan terms and
plan administrative practices that were inconsistent with employee
benefit expectations.43 In response to these concerns, Congress
enacted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act ("WPPDA") in
1958." The Act, though, reflecting its title, was based on disclosure
and did not create substantive rules governing plan administration or
investment of plan assets. "The theory of the law was that full
disclosure to participants and beneficiaries of the provisions of their
plan and its financial operations would deter abuse ('sunlight being
the best disinfectant') and would enable them to police the plans
themselves without requiring greater Government regulations or
interference."4
38. Following World War II, wage and price controls that limited new cash
compensation but permitted fringe benefits, and a burgeoning interest by labor unions in
pension and retirement benefits for their members and as a source of economic and
political power for the unions, led to substantial growth in retirement and health care
plans. HARBRECHT, supra note 35, at 7-10.
39. Gordon, supra note 33, at 15-24.
40. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW,supra note 19, at 1-4 to -7.
41. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2013)).
42. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 19, at 1-7 to -8.
43. Gordon, supra note 33, at 6.
44. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat.
997 (repealed 1975).
45. Gordon, supra note 33, at 6.
2015] 469
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Sunlight did not prove to be an especially effective disinfectant.
A 1964 book by Merton Bernstein' and a 1965 report 47 issued by a
cabinet-level task force created three years earlier by President
Kennedy to study private-sector retirement plans identified serious
shortcomings with retirement plans in the private sector, most
prominently the following: (1) forfeiture of benefits, primarily
because some plans had restrictive vesting rules; 48 (2) inadequate
funding of DB pension plans; 49 (3) lapses in judgment and honesty by
some of the people investing plan assets;50 (4) conflicts of interest
affecting plan assets;' (5) disparate treatment of certain categories of
employees in retirement plans;S2 (6) benefit losses when plans
terminated with insufficient assets;" and (7) tax equity.5 4 The
Bernstein book and the President's Committee's report made specific
recommendations for legislative change or further study in each of
these areas. 5
On one issue in particular the Committee's report was cautious,
however: whether there was a need for new, presumably federal,
standards for those who manage plan assets. The Committee's report
was equivocal:
This Committee recognizes the need for additional measures
for the protection of the interests of employees, but doubts
whether [the] problem is the lack of appropriate standards of
prudence. ... On the basis of present evidence, the Committee
does not propose the substitution of a new set of statutory
standards for the recognized standards of fiduciary
responsibility, although there appears to be a need for
strengthening statutory provisions for assuring compliance with
these standards.
46. MERTON C. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1964).
47. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE
RETIREMENT & WELFARE PROGRAMS, 89TH CONG., PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE
PROGRAMS, A REP. TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS
(Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM.].
48. Id. at 39; BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 259-60.
49. PRESIDENT'S COMM., supra note 47, at 47; BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 44-46.
50. PRESIDENT'S COMM., supra note 47, at 75.
51. Id. at 75-76.
52. Id. at 59.
53. See id. at 55; BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 86, 254-55.
54. BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 44-45.
55. See Gordon, supra note 33, at 9-10.
56. PRESIDENT'S COMM., supra note 47, at 73-74.
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The year after the report was issued, however, an investigation
by the Senate Committee on Government Operations suggested that
the law did not adequately constrain fiduciary misbehavior in pension
plans.57 The investigation focused on a Taft-Hartley plan that paid
substantial fees to a consulting company set up by one of its trustees.
A few months after the hearings, the chairman of the Committee,
Senator McClellan, introduced legislation that would have amended
the WPPDA to create federal fiduciary standards for those who
managed private-sector employee benefit plans." In 1967, the
Johnson Administration introduced a similar bill, which, like the
McClellan bill, was confined to fiduciary issues.' And later that same
year, Senator Jacob Javits introduced the first comprehensive pension
reform bill, which included, among other things, federal fiduciary
rules, minimum pension standards, minimum pension-funding rules,
and a federal insurance program.' These three bills, and especially
the comprehensive Javits bill, set the legislative stage for pension
reform. Seven years later, on Labor Day, President Gerald Ford
signed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 into
law.62
ERISA was a lengthy, complex legislative achievement, which
federalized employee benefits law and centered its regulation in three
federal agencies-agencies whose missions are sometimes in tension
but nevertheless were tasked with jointly implementing the new
statutory order. Six aspects of ERISA are particularly relevant to
the themes we develop in this Article, and we note them here.
First, Congress created substantive rules for pension plans,
including minimum vesting and accrual rules,' spousal protection
rules,65 and funding rules.66 A plan's favorable tax status is contingent
on the plan complying with these rules,' but the rules are also
generally enforceable by participants under jurisdictional grants
57. Gordon, supra note 33, at 10-11.
58. See id.
59. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 122 (2004).
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1.
63. See Dana M. Muir, Changing the Rules of the Game: Pension Plan Terminations
and Early Retirement Benefits, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1034, 1038-39, 1050 (1989).
64. See ERISA H§ 203, 204,29 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1054 (2012).
65. See ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055.
66. See ERISA §§ 301-05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-85.
67. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1)-(4), (7), (9)(B)(iv), (11)(A)-(B) (2012).
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provided in the labor section of ERISA. 8 As discussed below, the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine permits plan sponsors to undermine certain
of these requirements.69
Second, Congress did not impose parallel substantive standards
on health care or other welfare benefit plans.70 Beginning in the mid-
1980s, Congress began to add some substantive standards for health
care plans." Most importantly for purposes of the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine, ERISA's fiduciary standards have always applied to health
care and other welfare benefit plans.72
Third, Congress wrote broad, field-occupying preemption
language into the statute, which largely precluded states from
regulating private-sector employee benefit plans. While the
preemption rules have had a substantial effect on the applicability of
state law in numerous areas, their effect on health care and other
welfare benefit plans has been especially profound because of
ERISA's failure to create federal substantive standards for such
plans.74 Thus, the federal government simultaneously barred the
states from regulating employer-provided welfare benefits while
declining to do so itself."
Fourth, Congress included a provision in ERISA that, among
other things, made it unlawful to discharge or discriminate against a
participant for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any
right to which the participant may become entitled under the plan or
68. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
69. See infra text Part III.A.2.
70. See ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 ("This part [containing participation and
vesting standards] shall apply to any employee benefit plan .. . other than ... an employee
welfare benefit plan."); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081 ("This part [containing funding
standards] shall apply to any employee benefit plan ... other than ... an employee welfare
benefit plan.").
71. See Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA
in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 494 (1998)
(discussing legislation requiring health insurance plans to permit the continuation of
coverage after the end of employment).
72. See ERISA §401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 ("This part [containing the fiduciary
provisions] shall apply to any employee benefit plan ...
73. See ERISA § 514,29 U.S.C. § 1144.
74. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 70.
75. See Edward Alburo Morrisey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption Under the
Deemer Clause As Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J.
LEGIS. 307, 315 (1997). States retain the power to regulate insured health care plans.
Typically, however, employer-sponsored plans are self-insured, which places them outside
the boundaries of state regulation. Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About
the Constitution: How States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 275, 305 (2013).
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statute."6 As discussed below, the settlor/fiduciary doctrine permits
plan sponsors to treat some plan participants more favorably than
others in ways that we argue undermine this provision.
Fifth, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have opined
that in enacting ERISA, Congress was attempting to balance
competing tensions: "Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its
desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative
costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
offering. . . benefit plans in the first place."7 8 We recognize the
importance of encouraging plan sponsorship in a voluntary system but
argue below that the current scope of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine
fails to give appropriate recognition to congressional intent to protect
participant benefits."
Sixth, Congress created a federal fiduciary law for employee
plans, which we describe below.so
B. ERISA Reinvention of Fiduciary Law
Prior to ERISA, the many retirement plans whose assets were
held in trust were subject to the fiduciary law of trusts, which was
typically found in state law.' It is far from clear, however, from the
historical record whether state trust law had much impact on the
behavior of the individuals who were responsible for administering a
trust or managing its assets. There were, in any event, few reported
cases involving retirement plans that turned on principles of trust
law.82 This may be the reason why the President's Committee in its
1965 report found that "there appears to be a need for strengthening
statutory provisions for assuring compliance with [existing fiduciary]
76. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. This provision is discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 332-38.
77. See infra Part Il.C.4.
78. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996); see, e.g., Millsap v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2004); Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338
F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2003); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 269-70 (1st Cir.
1997).
79. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 397-400.
80. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104. This provision is discussed infra at text
accompanying note 99.
81. See Gordon, supra note 33, at 11-12.
82. CLOUD, supra note 33, at 113 (noting few adjudications of pension cases at the
time of publication of this work in 1930).
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standards," even though the Committee found "no evidence" that the
standards themselves were inadequate."
It is not difficult to speculate on why there were few state-law
trust cases involving retirement plans. Some retirement plans were
unfunded and those that were funded were not always implemented
through trust agreements.8M Most pre-ERISA pension plans, including
trusteed plans, included clauses that disclaimed any employee interest
in the trust corpus, which would have created obstacles for any
employee to bring a trust-based action against the plan or the plan
trustee.ss Indeed, when employees brought pre-ERISA cases in state
court, the cases were generally based on contractual rather than trust-
based legal theories, and they were generally brought against the
employer rather than against a plan trustee. Moreover, the common
law of trusts essentially prescribes a series of default rules that the
trust instrument can modify,87 and we think it reasonable to assume
that some pension trusts were drafted to ease or eliminate various
trust duties.' Each of these reasons alone, and certainly in
combination, would explain why so few trust-based civil actions were
brought in state court.
The situation was different in the federal courts after Taft-
Hartley was enacted. Taft-Hartley required that a plan with a union
role in plan management be structured as a trust if it received
employer contributions, with a union-designated trustee and a
83. PRESIDENT'S COMM., supra note 47, at xv.
84. See WOOTEN, supra note 59, at 21-22 (describing methods for funding retirement
plans other than trusts).
85. See David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism, 48 U. Pirr. L. REV. 427, 438-39 (1987) ("Early private pension plans
were usually unfunded. No viable safeguards insured that current employees would ever
receive pensions upon retirement, or that retirees would continue to receive their benefits.
Employers reinforced paternalism with express exculpatory language, disavowing all
liability for pension plan terminations or deficiencies.").
86. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim
Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1114 (2001) ("[T]he Supreme Court noted that the
resulting standard was consistent with the judicial standard pre-ERISA, which applied
principles of contract law in lieu of labor law.").
87. John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law's Limits on the Settlor's Power
to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 397 (2010) ("Neither the mandatory rules of
the Code, nor the comparable rules of the common law of trusts in non-Code jurisdictions,
undermine the default character of the rules of trust administration and trust
investment."); see also John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the
United States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1080 (2007) (describing comprehensive legislation as
filling gaps in vague areas of otherwise well-developed state trust law).
88. Decreasing the legal duties imposed on a trustee logically would have decreased
fees charged by trustees or increased the willingness of trustees to serve as such for
pension plans.
474 [Vol. 93
ERISA & FIDUCIARY DUTIES
management-designated trustee. 89 The trust had to be established for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to employees and their
beneficiaries.' From its passage until the enactment of ERISA, the
federal courts were fora to Taft-Hartley pension cases in which
participants contended that the plan trustees violated their fiduciary
responsibilities, primarily in adopting allegedly arbitrary plan
amendments to adjust benefits or misinterpreting a plan's benefit
eligibility provisions.9 1 This may have suggested to Congress that
creating a federal law of trusts for pension plans was familiar territory
for federal judges.
Building on the three bills introduced between 1965 and 1967,92 a
centerpiece of the legislation that became ERISA was the creation of
a federal law of fiduciary behavior. Congress, however, did not willy-
nilly incorporate the common law of trusts into the statute; rather, it
"in essence, codifie[d] and ma[d]e[] applicable to [employee plan]
fiduciaries certain principles developed in trusts."" ERISA's
statutory fiduciary regime builds on those principles but diverges
from the common law of trusts. Perhaps the two most significant ways
in which this fiduciary law departs from that common law are in the
law's reach. Trust law regulates the conduct of a trustee of a trust.9 4
ERISA, in contrast, regulates a broad class of actors, not just trustees,
and it regulates substantially all employee benefit plans regardless of
whether the plan is trusteed."
The actors regulated by ERISA's fiduciary provisions are
labeled, appropriately enough, "fiduciaries," which is a defined term
under the statute. Under the statute,
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee .. . with respect to
89. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2012).
90. Id.
91. See Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 587-88
(1993). The Supreme Court in 1993 held that the Taft-Hartley Act did not create federal
jurisdiction for such claims. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
93. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865.
94. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 586 (1990)
("Trust law ... long has required trustees to serve the interests of all beneficiaries . .. .").
95. See Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1995) (discussing ERISA's definition of fiduciary and its
differences from traditional trust law's definition).
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any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority
or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of
such plan.'
An aspect of this definition to which we will return later in the
Article is that a person is a fiduciary only to the extent he exercises
one of the enumerated functions." The statute, however, also makes a
fiduciary responsible for the breaches of another fiduciary for
knowingly participating in or concealing the other's breach, for
enabling the other's breach through his own breach, or for not
making reasonable efforts to correct the other's breach if he has
knowledge of it.98
ERISA imposes four general requirements on fiduciaries, all of
which are framed within an overarching command that the fiduciary
shall discharge her duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries: a duty of prudence, a duty to act
for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan, a duty to diversify investments to minimize
the risk of large losses except to the extent it is clearly prudent not to
do so, and a duty to administer the plan in accordance with the plan's
instruments "insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with the provisions of this [title]." 99
The quoted language is an explicit rejection of that aspect of the
common law of trusts that, as it developed, permitted a trust
agreement to modify the fiduciary standards that would otherwise
apply as default law." ERISA also provides that any plan or separate
agreement purporting to relieve a fiduciary of a statutory duty is void
as against public policy."
In addition to these general fiduciary standards, ERISA includes
a list of absolutely proscribed transactions between an employee
benefit plan and parties-in-interest, which are actors with a pre-
existing relationship with the plan." Unless a specific exemption
96. ERISA § 2(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).
97. See Muir, supra note 95, at 15.
98. ERISA, § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
99. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
100. See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2768 n.30 (2006) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 76 cmt. on Subsection (1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005)).
101. ERISA § 404,29 U.S.C. § 1110.
102. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
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applies,o a plan fiduciary that knowingly causes a plan to engage in a
prohibited transaction is liable for any harm to the plan, regardless of
whether the fiduciary's actions were prudent and made solely in the
best interests of the participants.'" The statutory framework appears
to assume that such actions are fraught with such potential peril to the
plan that liability should attach to the fiduciary, regardless of the
circumstances. It is better, Congress implicitly said, to squelch all such
interested-party transactions pretransaction-even those that might
have benefited the plan-than to try to assess liability
posttransaction. And the fiduciary can have liability to the plan even
if the plan benefits from the prohibited transaction." In addition, the
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") imposes an excise tax on the
interested party, regardless of either the fiduciary's or the party's
intent.'06
The prohibited transaction rules would bar many necessary and
often routine transactions in a plan's life-for example, the payment
of benefits to a participant or payments to service providers. Congress
therefore included in the statute a number of exemptions from the
prohibited transaction rules and also vested the Department of Labor
with authority to grant individual and class exemptions if the
Secretary of Labor finds that the exemption request satisfies statutory
criteria. 0
ERISA also includes some exceptions to the general fiduciary
rules. The duty to diversify does not apply to DC plans that are
designed to invest primarily in employer stock.0 s The fiduciary rules
do not apply to an individual's personal investment decisions in
certain "self-directed" DC plans.'" And ERISA specifically provides
that terminating DB plans and welfare benefit plans may distribute
assets to the employer notwithstanding ERISA's exclusive benefit
rule."o
103. For a comprehensive list of exemptions from these prohibited transactions, see
ERISA § 408,29 U.S.C. § 1108.
104. See Ryan P. Barry, Comment, ERISA's Purpose: The Conveyance of Information
from Trustee to Beneficiary, 31 CONN. L. REV. 735, 748-49 (1999).
105. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Murdock, 861 F.2d
1406, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding that even where benefits were paid in full, a
breaching fiduciary cannot retain ill-gotten profits).
106. See I.R.C. § 4975(a) (2012) (imposing an unconditional excise tax on all prohibited
transactions).
107. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 408, 88 Stat. 829, 883 (1974) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (2012)).
108. See ERISA § 404(a)(2),29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
109. See ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c).
110. See ERISA § 4044(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d).
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There is one other aspect of ERISA's fiduciary scheme that
merits attention here. The common law of trusts imposed a general
duty on trustees to furnish beneficiaries with information concerning
the administration of the trust and a separate duty to account to
beneficiaries for the investment and disbursement of plan assets."'
ERISA imposes specific disclosure obligations on plan
administrators. The courts have at least suggested that the ERISA
disclosure obligations define the only required disclosures, although
there is an open question of whether a fiduciary may have additional
disclosure obligations in certain circumstances under the general
ERISA duties of prudence and loyalty."' And the courts have held
that a fiduciary that does provide information-even if not required
by the statute-may not mislead participants and their
beneficiaries.'"3
C. Development of the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine and the Supreme
Court Trilogy
The settlor/fiduciary doctrine is an accretion of guidance from
the Department of Labor and decisions by the courts. The first
explicit iteration of the settlor/fiduciary distinction came in the form
of a 1986 DOL information letter in response to "questions regarding
the extent to which ERISA's fiduciary duty rules would apply to the
decision to terminate a pension plan."" 4 The DOL letter indicated
that
ill. See AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, SCOTT ON
TRUSTS §§ 172-73 (4th ed. 1987).
112. See Clovis Trevino Bravo, ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims:
Securities Litigation Under the Guise of ERISA?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 497,510-
12 (2009) (discussing ERISA's disclosure obligations and various courts' considerations of
whether a fiduciary's duties are limited to those enumerated in the statute).
113. See generally Dana M. Muir, Truth or Consequences: Varity v. Howe and Beyond,
13 LAB. LAw. 411 (1998) (discussing cases in which courts have held that a fiduciary's
material misrepresentation to employees is a violation of fiduciary duty, even if the
fiduciary was not obligated to make the disclosure).
114. Letter from Dennis M. Kass, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Labor, to John N.
Erlenborn (Mar. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Letter from Kass to Erlenborn], available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/ils/il031386.htmi. John Erlenborn was a ten-term
Congressman from Illinois who helped create a House Pension Task Force and was a key
participant in the legislative process that produced ERISA. See, e.g., Nicholas Braude,
John Erlenborn, Patriarch of Pension Legislation, Dead at 78, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS
(Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.pionline.com/article/20051114/PRINT/511140711/john-
erlenborn-patriarch-of-pension-legislation-dead-at-78. We found some discussion of the
idea of a settlor function as early as 1975, in the 1975 proceedings of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") National Institute in New York, the proceedings of which were
published by the ABA's Business Lawyer. See Panel Discussion, Who Are Fiduciaries?, 31
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in light of the voluntary nature of the private pension system
governed by ERISA, the Department has concluded that there
is a class of discretionary activities which relate to the
formation, rather than the management, of plans. These so-
called "settlor" functions include decisions relating to the
establishment, termination and design of plans and are not
fiduciary activities subject to Title I of ERISA."'
The letter went on, however, to express the view that "[a]lthough
the decision to terminate is generally not subject to the fiduciary
responsibility provisions of ERISA, the Department has emphasized
that activities undertaken to implement the termination decision are
generally fiduciary in nature."" 6
In an important sense, though, the letter was disingenuous in the
way it set up the issue, for there was no genuine disagreement that an
employer enjoyed virtually unfettered control over the decision to
establish, terminate, or design (subject to ERISA's substantive
requirements) an employee benefit plan, for these were not
controversial issues,"' although perhaps they should have been in
certain contexts. Rather, the letter was effectively focused on a
narrower issue, which was controversial: did an employer's decision to
terminate an overfunded pension plan for the purpose of capturing its
surplus assets implicate fiduciary duties, particularly when the
employer had to amend the plan to create an employer right to the
surplus assets?"' Given that the ERISA definition of fiduciary
includes a person "to the extent ... he exercises ... any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of [a plan's] assets,"" 9
it was certainly within the parameters of plausible argument that the
decision to amend a plan to create an employer right to capture a DB
plan's surplus assets was a fiduciary decision and perhaps even that
Bus. LAw. 83, 86 (1975). Compare id. at 87 ("[Marshall Bartlett:] They are not required to
act for the exclusive benefit of the employees in determining what kind of plan they are
going to have initially, or for that matter whether they are going to amend the plan in later
years to increase the benefit formula."), with id. at 90 ("[Daniel C. Knickerbocker:] I
would disagree therefore when you say that amending a plan is not an exercise of fiduciary
responsibility. It seems to me that the power to amend can be so exercised as to
accommodate to both the 'solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries' standard
and the fiduciaries' other obligations.").
115. Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Broadway Maint. Corp., 707 F.2d 647,
648 (1983) (outlining the procedures an employer must follow to voluntarily terminate a
pension plan).
118. See Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114.
119. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).
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the mere decision to terminate an overfunded plan for the purpose of
recovering plan assets was a fiduciary decision. After all, both the
decision to terminate the plan and the recapture of the assets involve
the exercise of authority or control of the disposition of a plan's
assets, even if they involve the exercise of an employer power to do
so.' 20 The question here would not have been whether there was an
employer power but rather whether the exercise of that power was
subject to fiduciary constraints. But the federal courts largely agreed
with the Department's position, with the Supreme Court endorsing
and demarcating the distinction between settlor and fiduciary
functions in a trilogy of cases, with the last of those cases giving the
doctrine particularly broad scope.12'
The Court decided the three trilogy cases in a relatively short
period between 1995 and 1999. The first case, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen,'22 involved a health care plan that did not include a
detailed amendment procedure. 2 3 For the first time, the Supreme
Court decided that employers had a fundamental right to amend or
terminate their employee benefit plans even if the plans themselves
did not explicitly provide for amendments or termination at the
discretion of the employer.'24 The Court did so with little analysis
other than a citation to a Sixth Circuit decision.12 5
In the Sixth Circuit case, the employer amended an unwritten
severance benefit plan by adopting a written severance plan that
denied benefits to employees who remained employed after a sale of
the business.'26 The plaintiffs argued that this amendment of the plan
constituted a fiduciary breach.127 In determining that no breach
120. See Amato v. W. Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding,
at least arguably, that an employer's decision to capture plan assets could be a fiduciary
decision). For a discussion of Amato and cases from the same period addressing plan
terminations that affect early retirement benefits, see generally Muir, supra note 63, at
1051-54. We return to this argument infra Part IV.B.
121. See generally Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999) (holding that
fiduciary duties do not arise from an employer's decision to amend a plan even when the
employer receives incidental benefits as a result of the amendment).
122. 514 U.S. 73 (1995).
123. See id. at 79-80 (describing the employer's amendment plan as the "simplest of
plans" with the "barest of procedures").
124. See id. at 78-80, 85 (holding that an employer did not violate ERISA by
terminating its benefit plan because, although simple and without a termination provision,
the employer's plan for amendment satisfied ERISA's requirements).
125. See id. at 78 (citing Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir.
1990)).
126. Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 944 (6th Cir. 1990).
127. See id. at 946-47.
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occurred, the Sixth Circuit drew a line between decisions relating to
plan assets or plan administration (fiduciary actions) and decisions
such as plan adoptions, terminations, and amendments, which firms
undertake as business decisions (not fiduciary actions).'28
The very next year the Supreme Court again took up the
question of an employer's right to amend its plan in Lockheed Corp.
v. Spink,129 a case involving a DB pension plan.'" The facts of the case
were simple: the employer added an early retirement provision to its
plan, a provision that required a participant electing to retire early to
release all employment claims against the employer.'"' In Spink, the
Court went beyond its cursory determination in Curtiss-Wright and
considered the question of what employer actions vis-A-vis a plan
constitute fiduciary actions.'32 In contrast to the policy-based
approach the DOL took in its 1986 letter,'33 the Supreme Court based
its decision squarely on an interpretation of ERISA's definition of the
term "fiduciary."'" According to the Court, the statute's activity-
based fiduciary definition meant that some employer actions are
fiduciary actions and others are not.'35 Since ERISA's language does
not specifically include plan design among the discretionary actions
that give rise to fiduciary status, as compared to its inclusion of plan
administration, management, and control of plan assets, the Court
determined that the act of amending a plan is not a fiduciary act.' 6 Its
discussion of the distinction between discretionary acts of plan design
(not fiduciary acts) and discretionary acts of plan administration and
128. Id. at 947.
129. 517 U.S. 882 (1996).
130. Id. at 885.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 890-91.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
134. Spink, 517 U.S. at 890-91. For the language of the definition, see supra text
accompanying note 96.
135. Spink, 517 U.S. at 890-91.
136. Id. at 890 ("When employers undertake those actions, they do not act as
fiduciaries, but are analogous to the settlors of a trust. This rule is rooted in the text of
ERISA's definition of fiduciary. As the Second Circuit has observed, 'only when fulfilling
certain defined functions, including the exercise of discretionary authority or control over
plan management or administration,' does a person become a fiduciary under § 3(21)(A).
'[B]ecause [the] defined functions [in the definition of fiduciary] do not include plan
design, an employer may decide to amend an employee benefit plan without being subject
to fiduciary review.' We recently recognized this very point, noting that 'it may be true
that amending or terminating a plan ... cannot be an act of plan "management" or
"administration." ' " (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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management (fiduciary acts) is where we find the Court's first
reference in an ERISA case to "the settlor-fiduciary distinction."'
By the third case of the trilogy, the Court became impatient with
the limitations being imposed by the lower courts on employer
actions and wrote in broad terms. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, a plan sponsor amended a DB plan to require
participating employees to make annual contributions."' It was this
facet of requiring employee contributions that distinguished the
Hughes plan from the plan that had been at issue in Spink. Over time,
the Hughes plan had become overfunded, which permitted Hughes to
cease making any contributions to the plan for a period of eight years,
even though employees continued to contribute during this period.14
Hughes then amended the plan on two occasions: first, to use some of
the surplus assets to provide enhanced early retirement benefits for
selected employees and, second, to eliminate the contribution
requirement for newly hired employees.14'
A group of plan participants alleged that Hughes had breached
its ERISA fiduciary duties when it amended the plan to use the
surplus assets to benefit some contributing employees
disproportionately (the first amendment) and when it amended the
plan to use the surplus assets to provide benefits for employees who
had not contributed to the plan at all (the second amendment).'42 The
Ninth Circuit ruled that, to the extent that the surplus assets were
attributable to the employee contributions, the participants had stated
a cause of action for an ERISA fiduciary breach.143 One way of
understanding the distinction drawn by the Ninth Circuit is that the
employees' contributions made them co-settlors of the plan.'" Thus,
Hughes would not have the power to unilaterally amend the terms of
the plan, at least in a manner that harmed the participants who had
been contributing to the plan.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit,'4 5 using expansive and unambiguous language that left little
137. Id. at 891.
138. 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
139. Id. at 435.
140. Id. at 436.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 436-37.
143. See Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 105 F.3d 1288, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997), amended
by 128 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
144. See id. at 1311-12 (Norris, J., dissenting) ("The majority seems to be saying that
employees are co-settlors of contributory plans.").
145. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 435.
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room for the lower courts to continue to draw distinctions between
various types of benefit plans.14
We made clear in Spink that our reasoning applied both to
"pension benefit plans" and "welfare benefit plans," since
"[t]he definition of fiduciary makes no distinction between
persons exercising authority over" these different types of
plans. Our conclusion applies with equal force to persons
exercising authority over a contributory plan, a noncontributory
plan, or any other type of plan. Our holding did not turn, as the
Court of Appeals below thought, on the type of plan being
amended for the simple reason that the plain language of the
statute defining fiduciary makes no distinction. Rather, it
turned on whether the employer's act of amending its plan
constituted an exercise of fiduciary duty. In Spink, we
concluded it did not. 147
The Hughes Court's approach thus directly links back to its
interpretation in Spink of ERISA's definition of fiduciary. Again, the
Court focused on the difference between design decisions and
discretionary plan administration.'" Even in the context of a plan
where employees made contributions and the employer had stopped
making contributions, the decision treats Hughes as the only plan
settlor. And, as the settlor, Hughes was free even to design the plan's
terms, including who would receive plan benefits. In the words of the
Court:
The same act of amending here also does not constitute the
action of a fiduciary, although Hughes' Plan happens to be one
to which employees contribute. In general, an employer's
decision to amend a pension plan concerns the composition or
design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer's
fiduciary duties which consist of such actions as the
administration of the plan's assets. ERISA's fiduciary duty
requirement simply is not implicated where Hughes, acting as
the Plan's settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or
structure of the Plan such as who is entitled to receive Plan
benefits and in what amounts, or how such benefits are
146. In 1986 Congress amended ERISA to provide for employees sharing in surplus
assets on termination, but that would not have applied in the Hughes situation because it
did not involve a plan termination. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1132(a),
100 Stat. 2085, 2478-81 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980 (2012)).
147. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443-44 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 444 ("In general, an employer's decision to amend a pension plan concerns
the composition or design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer's fiduciary
duties which consist of such actions as the administration of the plan's assets.").
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calculated. A settlor's powers include the ability to add a new
benefit structure to an existing plan. Respondents' three
fiduciary duty claims are directly foreclosed by Spink's holding
that, without exception, "[p]lan sponsors who alter the terms of
a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries."149
The Hughes decision also quoted language from Spink that listed
specific actions that are settlor actions and not subject to ERISA's
fiduciary obligations.
Plan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the
category of fiduciaries. As we said with respect to the
amendment of welfare benefit plans, "[e]mployers or other plan
sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any
time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans." When
employers undertake those actions, they do not act as
fiduciaries, but are analogous to the settlors of a trust.50
This language, with its inclusion of the modifier "generally,"
arguably left some room for lower courts to maneuver. As a general
matter, however, that has not happened."'
In Hughes, the Court ignored rather than engaged the interests
of employees. This was not a necessary outcome. The Court could
have recognized that, at least because of the direct contributions they
made to the pension plan, the employees also held interests in the
plan and acted as plan settlors, or at least were entitled to the
employer considering their interests in the plan in the amendment
process. In our judgment, the broad sweep of the Court's language in
Hughes regarding the settlor/fiduciary doctrine sometimes (but not
always) yields questionable policy outcomes. 52
II. DOCTRINAL BOUNDARIES AND APPLICATION
Despite the rigidity in the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, there are at
least two difficult questions that the courts have not yet been able to
149. Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added) (other citations omitted) (quoting Lockheed Corp.
v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (alteration in original)).
150. Id. at 443 (other citations omitted) (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S.
882, 890 (1996) (alteration in original)).
151. See generally infra Part II.C (analyzing the contextual application of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine). The Court's use of the term "generally," we note, can be
construed to refer to ERISA's substantive limitations on the power to design a plan, but
the Spink reference to "generally" might also be viewed as a bit of hedging, allowing the
development of limiting principles on settlor freedom in subsequent cases. See Spink, 517
U.S. at 890.
152. See infra Part IlIl.A.
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coherently and fully answer about the doctrine: first, where is the
demarcation line between settlor decisions and fiduciary
implementation of settlor decisions;' and second, to what extent
does the doctrine protect plan sponsors when they engage in business
or settlor-type activities that do not include adopting, formally
amending, or terminating a plan?5 4 The first question is perhaps the
more important, for it is one moving part of the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine that might be judicially engineered to control some of the
doctrine's potential excesses.155
After the Supreme Court's Hughes decision, the parameters of
the settlor/fiduciary doctrine were not clearly defined.16 More than
thirteen years later, some lack of clarity remains, but overall the trend
has been to find that employers wear their settlor hats when engaging
in many plan-related activities.'5 7 Courts continue to address
questions that turn on the distinction between plan design and
termination, which are not fiduciary acts, and implementation of
those decisions, which are fiduciary acts.'"5 The first subsection below
analyzes the doctrine in that area, beginning with one of the Supreme
Court decisions since the trilogy that directly addressed the
settlor/fiduciary distinction. We designate this strand of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine as the plan structure strand. The application
of doctrinal boundaries also occurs when plan sponsors engage in
business or settlor-type activities but do not formally adopt, amend,
or terminate a plan. We designate this strand of the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine as the business ddcision strand. The second subsection below
engages those situations. The third subsection considers the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine's boundaries in the context of many of the
employee benefits situations to which the settlor/fiduciary doctrine
applies.
A. Implementing the Definition of Implementation
In 1999, Professor Muir wrote about the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine, stating that the "dichotomy between actions taken to amend
plans, and actions taken to implement amendments [and, by
implication, terminations,] is likely to continue to create problems."'15
153. See infra Part II.A.
154. See infra Part II.B.
155. See infra Part IV.A-B.
156. Muir, supra note 7, at 219-20.
157. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.
158. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.
159. Muir, supra note 7, at 220.
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That has proven to be true. On the one hand, the lack of doctrinal
clarity surrounding these questions is problematic for all the usual
reasons that uncertainty in law is sometimes considered problematic.
But, we also see the lack of clarity as offering judges an opportunity
to tame some of the more problematic aspects of the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine, an issue to which we will return in the last Part of this
Article.
In its 2007 decision in Beck v. PACE International Union," the
Supreme Court took up the line-drawing challenge in a case involving
a plan termination.'6' Crown Paper and its parent ("Crown")
sponsored multiple DB plans at the time Crown declared
bankruptcy. 62 Some of the plans, which covered unionized
employees, had enjoyed more financial success than Crown and in
total were overfunded by approximately five million dollars.163 Crown
decided to terminate the plans by purchasing annuities, which is the
typical way of terminating a fully or overfunded plan.'" Through the
annuities, the employees and retirees would receive all of their
promised pension benefits assuming the continued claims-paying
ability of the insurance company.165 The remaining five million dollars
of overfunding would go into the bankruptcy estate to be allocated to
Crown's creditors.'6 6
The union, PACE International Union ("PACE"), had other
ideas. PACE proposed that Crown transfer all of the liabilities and
assets in the relevant plans to a multiemployer pension plan that
covered PACE union members.66 That would have enabled the
multiemployer plan to capture the five million dollars in excess
funding.'6 Crown proceeded with its purchase of annuities without
seriously considering PACE's proposition.'16 PACE then alleged that
Crown had violated its fiduciary obligation to act for the exclusive
160. 551 U.S. 96 (2007).
161. Id. at 98.
162. Id. at 98-99.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 100, 103.
165. Id. at 106.
166. Id. at 99.
167. Id.
168. Id. At the Supreme Court, PACE indicated it would have agreed to a transfer of
plan assets to its multiemployer fund even if Crown retained the five million dollar
surplus. Id. at 100 n.2. Multiemployer pension plans provide benefits for the unionized
employees of multiple employers. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee
Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL .L. & PUB. POL'Y
77, 82-88 (2011) (explaining the basics of multiemployer plans).
169. Beck, 551 U.S. at 100-01.
[Vol. 93486
ERISA & FIDUCIARY DUTIES
purpose of providing plan benefits when it decided to implement the
plan terminations through annuity purchases in order to recapture
assets for Crown's creditors.o
The first issue, and the relevant one for this Article, on which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari was whether the decision to
purchase annuities was part of the decision to terminate the plan, and
thus was not a fiduciary decision, or whether it constituted
implementation of the termination decision, and thus was a fiduciary
decision."' The bankruptcy court, district court, and Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals all found in PACE's favor; Crown's decisions not to
consider PACE's plan merger proposal and to purchase the annuities
were acts undertaken in the implementation of the termination.'72
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, disagreed.'73 The
Court relied on ERISA's language governing plan terminations and
guidance by the applicable regulatory agencies, which both indicated
that a plan merger is not a permissible way to achieve a plan
termination."' PACE had argued that the statutory language clearly
permitted merger as an allowable way to implement a plan
termination."' The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation's ("PBGC") interpretation of the
statute to mean that "merger is an alternative to (rather than an
example of) plan termination.""' Applying this view of the statute,
once Crown decided to terminate the pension plans, which it was
entitled to do without fiduciary ramifications under the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine, the decision to purchase annuities was
subsumed in that termination decision. 77
It is worth focusing on precise language in the Beck decision and
teasing out its implications. The Court set the stage for its analysis by
stating that "[w]hich hat the employer is proverbially wearing
depends upon the nature of the function performed."'7 1 It also noted
that this "inquiry ... is aided by the common law of trusts."' 79 This
suggests that if the nature of the action is one that historically would
have been performed by a trust settlor, then the action is not subject
170. Id. at 100.
171. Id. at 101-02.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 98, 110-11.
174. Id. at 102-10.
175. Id. at 105.
176. Id. at 104.
177. See id. at 102.
178. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
179. Id.
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to ERISA's fiduciary standards. The Beck Court quoted a phrase
from the Hughes'" decision that has been cited by a number of lower
courts" ' : " '[D]ecision[s] regarding the form or structure' of a plan are
generally settlor functions."'82 This language implies that the
settlor/fiduciary analysis takes into account the effect of a decision so
that even decisions not implemented by plan amendment may be
settlor decisions.
Consider the Court's approach to the settlor/fiduciary distinction
in Beck. The Court appeared willing, if ERISA provided for multiple
ways to implement a termination, to treat the selection of a particular
implementation method as a fiduciary decision. The Court decided,
however, that the condition precedent did not exist; a merger is not a
statutorily permitted way to implement a plan termination."' Thus,
Crown's decision to terminate was a decision on the plan's structure
or form,'" making it a settlor decision, and, as a result, Crown had no
obligation to consider PACE's merger proposal.'
Varity Corp. v. Howe'86 is the only case in which the Supreme
Court applied the settlor/fiduciary doctrine to find that employer acts
were fiduciary in nature because they constituted plan
administration.187  The employer and plan sponsor, Varity, had
consolidated its financially unsuccessful divisions into a new
subsidiary.' To encourage active employees in those divisions to
transfer voluntarily to the new subsidiary, Varity engaged in an
180. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
181. See, e.g., Bennett v. Conrail Matched Say. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671, 679
(3d Cir. 1999); Coriale v. Xerox Corp., 775 F. Supp. 2d 583, 599 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); see also
Slusarski v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 632 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167 (D.R.I. 2009) ("ERISA's
fiduciary duty requirement simply is not implicated where [the companyl, acting as the
Plan's settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or structure of the Plan such as who is
entitled to receive Plan benefits and in what amounts, or how such benefits are
calculated." (alteration in original) (emphasis added)).
182. Beck, 551 U.S. at 101-02 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hughes, 525 U.S.
at 444).
183. See id. at 110.
184. See id. at 101-02.
185. See id. It is not clear, even if termination could have been accomplished by means
of a merger, that Crown would have been obligated to merge the plans. The Court found it
unnecessary to address the issue of whether a decision on a plan merger "could switch
from a settlor to a fiduciary function depending upon the context in which the merger
proposal is raised." Id. at 102. The Court termed that "an odd" idea. Id. It should be said,
though, that the Court's decision was based on its holding that a merger was different than
a termination. Id. at 106. It is plausible that the Court might have held that decisions on
how to implement a termination are subject to fiduciary constraints.
186. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
187. Id. at 492.
188. Id. at 493.
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extensive communications program.'89 Although Varity had
intentionally structured the new subsidiary to be financially insolvent,
the communications program omitted that information.'" Instead,
Varity represented to the employees that they could expect benefits
equivalent to those they had enjoyed while employed at Varity.'9' The
business results were predictable: the subsidiary failed. 92 The health
care plans then terminated, leaving participants without those
benefits.'9 3  The participants sued, alleging that Varity's
communications violated ERISA's fiduciary standards." The
preliminary question, though, was whether Varity acted as a fiduciary
when communicating about the plan with the employees.' The
Supreme Court held that Varity undertook the communications
program as part of its plan administration, and thus Varity was a
fiduciary when communicating with the employees about the plan.,'
The Court looked to trust law to determine whether Varity was
wearing its fiduciary or settlor hat. According to the Court: "The
ordinary trust law understanding of fiduciary 'administration' of a
trust is that to act as an administrator is to perform the duties
imposed, or exercise the powers conferred, by the trust
documents." 97 This includes powers "necessary or appropriate" to
carry out the purposes of the trust, even when the trust documents do
not explicitly grant specific powers.' Communicating forward-
looking information about the plan to employees asked to make
decisions based on that information is an act in furtherance of the
trust's purposes.' 9 From a contextual perspective, the Court thought
that reasonable employees could think that their employer was acting,
at least in part, as administrator of the plan when talking about the
plan's future.20
We can speculate that the Court may have come to a different
conclusion if Varity's communications with its employees had not
189. See id. at 499-501.
190. See id. at 494.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 493-94.
194. See id. at 492.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 505. Varity also transferred approximately four thousand retirees to the
benefit plans of the new organization without obtaining the retirees' consent. Id. at 494.
197. Id. at 502.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 503.
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been so transparently dishonest. The lack of a definitive boundary
between fiduciary and nonfiduciary acts means that courts have some
discretion in characterizing particular actions. Varity was wearing at
least two hats and arguably three during this time period. Varity
determined the terms of its plans while wearing its settlor hat.
Arguably, the decision to create a new subsidiary and to offer
employees the opportunity to transfer to that subsidiary was made
while wearing its business decision-maker hat.20 1 And when Varity
communicated with employees about the plan it was wearing its
fiduciary hat.202
In sum, the courts have confronted questions involving the
distinction between plan adoption, amendment, and termination,
which are settlor actions, and conduct that occurs while implementing
those settlor actions or engaging in plan management, which is subject
to fiduciary standards in a wide variety of contexts.203 For ease of
reference, we will refer to this strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine
as the "plan structure" strand. Before considering the contexts in
which those questions arise, the next subsection explains the second
strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.
B. Formalism-Beyond Adoption, Amendment, Termination
In each of the trilogy cases, Spink,20 Curtiss-Wright,205 and
Hughes,20 the Supreme Court decided that a plan amendment
constituted a settlor act, not a fiduciary act. And, in Varity Corp.,207
the Court found that communications, which obviously were not plan
amendments, were fiduciary acts. The factual differences among
those cases, along with the Beck 21 and Varity Corp. Courts' reliance
on the common law of trusts,209 raise the possibility that the
distinction between settlor and fiduciary acts is a formalistic one.
Indeed, the plan structure strand of the doctrine suggests that acts
201. See infra notes 348-51 and accompanying text (discussing some cases
characterizing employer actions as business decisions rather than fiduciary acts). This
question was not before the Court in Varity. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 492.
202. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 503.
203. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing cases addressing the boundary between
settlor functions and fiduciary functions and categorizing the cases by the type of benefits
context in which they arose).
204. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 891 (1996).
205. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73,78 (1995).
206. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,444 (1999).
207. Varity, 516 U.S. at 505.
208. Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007).
209. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 497.
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taken through plan amendments always are settlor acts. In theory,
formalism could apply in the opposite direction as well. Discretionary
acts other than plan adoption, amendment, and termination may
always be fiduciary acts.
But, even if, under current Supreme Court doctrine, all plan
amendments constitute settlor acts, it does not necessarily follow that
all plan-related actions not taken through a plan amendment
constitute fiduciary acts. The Hughes Court referred to settlor actions
as those that " 'adopt, modify, or terminate' " benefit plans.210 The
term "modify" might indicate that settlor actions encompass a
broader range of actions than just formal plan amendments.
As a reminder, the Supreme Court's development of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine was premised on its interpretation of the
statutory definition of fiduciary. 1' The statute defines fiduciary
functions as including discretionary acts of plan management and plan
administration.212 Arguably then, the definition encompasses a more
limited set of actions than the entire set of discretionary acts that
affect benefit plans. Many discretionary business decisions, such as
entering a new market, setting appropriate levels of cash reserves,
developing research and development programs, or developing and
implementing employment policies, have an indirect, and sometimes
even a direct, effect on an employer's benefit plans. The challenge
then is to distinguish between instances where an employer is wearing
its ERISA fiduciary hat because it is engaging in discretionary plan
administration or management or controlling plan assets and those
circumstances where the employer is wearing its business hat because
it is engaged in decision making about its business operations.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the distinction between an
employer's fiduciary role in administering a plan and its role in
running its business. The Third Circuit, however, confronted such a
situation in Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp.,213 which it decided
shortly after the Court's Hughes decision.214 Thomas & Betts
Corporation ("T&B") asked certain engineering employees to
relocate from New Jersey to Tennessee.215 T&B's severance plan
provided for the payment of benefits to "employees who were
'involuntarily terminated' when 'the terminating manager believes the
210. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443 (quoting Curtiss- Wright, 514 U.S. at 78).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
212. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i), (iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), (iii) (2012).
213. 188 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
214. Hughes, 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
215. See Noorily, 188 F.3d at 156.
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granting of such pay is appropriate.' "216 T&B indicated in an initial
communication to employees that employees who received but
rejected a relocation offer would receive severance benefits.217 Once
T&B realized, however, that substantial numbers of the engineering
employers were going to refuse to relocate, it decided to deny them
severance benefits in an effort to encourage them to move.218 The
employees alleged that T&B's refusal to pay the severance benefits
constituted a violation of T&B's ERISA fiduciary duties.2 19
The Third Circuit held that T&B's decision not to pay severance
benefits was an action that T&B undertook while wearing its business
hat, not its fiduciary hat.220 It was irrelevant to the analysis that T&B
had not amended the severance plan. Instead of focusing on whether
the plan had been amended,22' which is important to the plan
structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, the court found it
compelling that T&B exercised its "discretion ... as an employer
through its terminating manager rather than as an administrator
through its Corporate Benefits Committee."22 2 Under this analysis,
the denial of severance benefits to employees was made by T&B in its
capacity as an employer because it was in T&B's business interest to
encourage the employees to transfer to Tennessee. 2 3 The decision
illustrates an employer's right to make business decisions that affect
employee benefit plans without the constraints of ERISA fiduciary
obligations. This is the strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine that we
refer to as the "business decision" strand.
The Third Circuit's approach in the Noorily decision provides an
interesting counterpoint to the Supreme Court's decision in Varity
Corp. v. Howe.224 As discussed above, Varity arguably was wearing its
management hat when it decided to form a new subsidiary. 225 Its
discussion with employees on their transfer to the new subsidiary then
could have been viewed as also occurring while wearing that
management hat.
216. Id. (quoting plan language).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 158-59 (discussing claim for fiduciary breach).
220. See id. at 159.
221. The Third Circuit might have categorized each of the employment decisions made
by a T&B manager as being the equivalent of a plan amendment.
222. Noorily, 188 F.3d at 159.
223. Id.
224. 516 U.S. 489 (1996). The Varity decision is discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 186-200.
225. See supra text accompanying note 201.
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In sum, the settlor/fiduciary doctrine should be understood as
comprising two strands, either of which may result in an employer
action being found to be a settlor action and not subject to ERISA's
fiduciary constraints. One strand, the plan structure strand, holds
definitively that plan sponsors act as settlors and not fiduciaries
whenever they adopt, amend, or terminate a benefit plan. The second
strand, the business decision strand, is more flexible in its application
and permits an employer's actions taken with a business purpose to
be recognized as settlor actions, or at least their equivalent, even
though they are taken through a mechanism other than the adoption,
amendment, or termination of a benefit plan. The next subsection
considers the wide range of employee benefit situations in which the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine has application.
C. The Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine's Reach Across Employee Benefits
The breadth of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine's reach through its
two strands illustrates what is at stake in the application of the
doctrine for both the employers that sponsor plans and the employees
who expect to earn benefits from them. Courts have applied the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine across many types of employee benefit
plans, ranging from traditional pension plans to health care plans,226
from cases involving one employee to decisions that affect the
benefits of all or large sections of an employer's workforce.227 The
settlor/fiduciary doctrine also arises in the context of corporate
reorganizations and restructurings and when an employer
communicates, directly or indirectly, with its employees. 228 As we
analyze the contextual application of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine
here, we further consider the application of its plan structure and
business decision strands before critiquing the doctrine in the next
Part.
1. DB Plan Funding
As referenced above,229 ERISA contains a series of funding rules
intended to ensure that DB plans have sufficient assets to pay the
benefits they promise.230 However, the plan structure strand of the
226. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.1-7.
227. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.1-7.
228. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.1-7.
229. See supra text accompanying note 66.
230. ERISA §§ 301-305, 29 U.S.C. 0§ 1081-1085 (2012). Parallel funding requirements
are found in the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 412 (2012). The IRS has primary
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settlor/fiduciary doctrine protects the adoption of plan amendments
even if those amendments result in significant plan underfunding.
This occurred in one multiemployer DB plan when the employers and
union agreed to terminate the employers' contribution obligation.23 '
The plan's actuary proposed that the plan trustees adopt a benefit
structure consistent with the plan remaining fully funded in
perpetuity. 232 Whether intentionally or because they failed to
understand the actuary's proposal, the trustees instead amended the
plan to provide a level of benefits that was not sustainable.233 As a
result, the plan became severely underfunded.2 "
In addressing allegations that the trustees breached their
fiduciary duty by adopting the generous benefit structure,235 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied what we have identified as the plan
structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. Because the trustees
took action through a plan amendment, their decision on the benefit
structure was not fiduciary in nature.236 Instead it was a plan design
decision, protected by the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. 237 The Supreme
Court of the United States also has applied the plan structure strand
to protect employer decisions that increase benefits for a subset of
employees at some cost, direct or indirect, to other employees.238
In an effort to decrease the risk associated with DB benefit
promises made to retirees, several companies have shifted the
responsibility for the retirees' pension annuities to insurance
companies. For example, Verizon caused its pension plan for
management employees to purchase annuities from Prudential
Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") for approximately
authority in enforcing plan funding obligations. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra
note 19, at 3-20.
231. Gard v. Blankenburg, 33 Fed. App'x 722, 725 (6th Cir. 2002).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 726.
236. Id. at 728.
237. Id. at 728; see also Hartline v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 134 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that a variety of plan decisions made by
multiemployer plan trustees regarding contribution rates were not fiduciary actions
because they were plan design decisions), affd, 286 F.3d 598, 599 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
238. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1999) (stating that
"[in general, an employer's decision to amend a pension plan concerns the composition or
design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer's fiduciary duties"). For a
discussion of the Hughes decision more generally, see supra text accompanying notes 143-
52.
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41,000 retirees. 23 9 For the future, the annuities will provide the full
amount of the benefits owed to those retirees, approximately $7.4
billion at the time of the annuity purchase.2" The benefits to Verizon
of this transaction, one of the types of transactions used as part of a
"de-risking" strategy, are numerous and include avoiding future
longevity risk, removing the pension liabilities from its balance sheet,
and decreasing the potential increase in Verizon's minimum pension
contributions as a result of interest rate decreases.241 Some retirees
whose pensions now will be paid by Prudential realize at least one
potential benefit as a result of the transaction. If in the future the
PBGC assumes responsibility for the Verizon plan at a time when it is
underfunded, retiree benefits would be capped according to the
statutory cap for benefits paid by the PBGC.2 42 Generally, however,
the potential implications for the retirees are troubling. Because their
benefits are no longer paid from an ERISA plan, the benefits of those
retirees may no longer receive federal protection in the case of
personal bankruptcy.243 And, if in the future, Prudential is unable to
pay their benefits, the retirees will not have any guarantee from the
PBGC. Instead, their protections will be limited to those provided by
the relevant state law governing insurance companies.
The retirees whose benefit obligations Verizon transferred to
Prudential sued, alleging a variety of claims, including that Verizon
239. Lee v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 486,489 (N.D. Tex. 2013). General
Motors engaged in a similar transaction that reportedly would affect approximately 42,000
of 118,000 retirees and twenty-six billion dollars in benefits. David Shepardson & Melissa
Burden, GM Offers Lump-Sum Buyout of Pensions, DETROIT NEWS (June 2, 2012),
http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p-action=keyword&s-searchtype=
keyword&p-product=DTNB&p-theme=gannett&s site=detnews (accessed by searching
article title in the archive search box).
240. Lee, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
241. See Benjamin Ruffel, This Changes Everything, AICIO, Sept. 2012, at 43-44,
available at http://www.ai-ciodigital.com/ai-cio/201209#pg42 (discussing the effect of
interest rate changes on contribution obligations in the context of de-risking).
242. See Lee, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (citation omitted) ("[P]articipant benefits are
guaranteed by the PBGC up to a statutory level."). The PBGC's current cap on benefits
for a retiree who is age sixty-five at the time plan terminates is $4,943.18 per month.
Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION,
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee.html (last
visited January 6, 2014).
243. The rights of annuitants against creditors would be decided by state law, as would
the ability of the annuitant to assign future benefits. See, e.g., Laura S. McAlister,
Comment, The Inefficiencies of Exclusion: The Importance of Including Insurance
Companies in the Bankruptcy Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 129, 130-34 (2008)
(discussing the application of state law to insurance company (the typical annuity
providers) insolvency).
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breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to them.2" The court rejected
the retirees' fiduciary claim on the basis of the plan design strand of
the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. As the court explained: "Because
amending a plan is not a fiduciary function, Verizon was not acting in
a fiduciary capacity when it amended the Plan to direct the purchase
of an annuity for participants meeting certain criteria."245
Some employers have also amended DB plans to transfer
financial risk directly to retirees by giving them a one-time post-
retirement election to transform their annuity benefit into a lump-
sum option.2" While this is a bonanza for those individuals with
known terminal illnesses, for most participants it is a honey-trap, with
far less financial value than the continuing annuity that they would be
giving up. But employers offer this option not because they want to
reward employees with terminal illnesses, but because they believe
that enough relatively healthy employees will make financially
irrational decisions to forego the continuing annuity for the less
valuable lump sum to make the lump sum less costly to the employer
than retaining the benefit in the plan or paying a premium to transfer
it to an insurer. What is more, we believe it is likely that some retirees
will be suffering diminished mental capacity and therefore will not be
in a good position to make a reasoned choice. But the decision to
offer the lump sum is nevertheless a settlor decision, even if there is
clear evidence that the employer is offering it with the expectation
that most employees who choose the option will be damaging their
financial welfare in retirement.
The business decision strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine also
may protect employer actions that implicate plan funding. When an
employer with limited financial resources decides to pay corporate
obligations instead of making contributions to a DB plan, the
relationship between the business decision and plan funding is
relatively direct. Courts typically categorize those choices as business
decisions rather than ERISA fiduciary actions.247
244. Lee, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
245. Id. at 493.
246. See, e.g., Susan Tompor, Lump-Sum Pension a Tough Call for General Motors,
Ford Retirees, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 14, 2012), http://www.freep.com/article/
20120614/COLO7/206140488/Lump-sum-pension-offer-a-tough-call-for-General-Motors-
Ford-retirees (reporting that Ford and GM offered their retirees an option to receive
lump-sum benefits).
247. See Harpster v. AARQUE Mgmt. Corp., No. 4:03CV1282, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30811, at *23-25 (N.D. Ohio July 22, 2005) (holding that a decision to pay dividends was a
discretionary business decision and not alone a fiduciary breach); In re Brobeck, Phleger
& Harrison, LLP, 414 B.R. 627, 637 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) ("The clear majority of the
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2. DC Plan Investments
Whatever assets are in a participant's DC plan account at
retirement constitute the participant's benefit. 2 ' Thus, net investment
returns are an important factor in a participant's ability to build
wealth in those accounts. It is necessary here to take a short detour to
explain two prevalent types of DC plans: 401(k) plans and employee
stock ownership plans ("ESOPs"). Although the terms of 401(k)
plans vary, the defining characteristic of such plans is that they must
permit employees who are eligible to take part in a 401(k) plan to
choose whether to contribute pre-tax earnings to that employee's own
plan account.2 4 9 ESOPs differ from 401(k) plans in two ways that are
important for this Article. First, ERISA requires ESOPs to invest
primarily in employer stock, whereas no such provision exists for
standard 401(k) plans.250 Second, ESOPs typically hold employer
stock in a suspense account.251 Over time, as employees earn plan
contributions, the plan transfers stock from the suspense account to
participant accounts.252 Finally, a KSOP is a hybrid of a 401(k) and an
ESOP.2 53 KSOPs permit employees to make contributions that are
treated as 401(k) contributions, although they may be. invested in
employer stock.254 In addition, the employer may also contribute
employer stock, which typically is used to "match" employee
contributions at a specified rate.255
few courts dealing with the issue of unpaid employer contributions, regardless of the plan
type, hold that choosing not to make employer contributions is a business or corporate
function, not a fiduciary function with respect to a plan."), aff'd, 430 B.R. 898 (N.D. Cal.
2010); see also Holdeman v. Devine, 474 F.3d 770, 778 (10th Cir. 2007) (deciding that an
employer was not acting as a fiduciary in allocating assets to business debts instead of to
health care plan premiums), affd, 572 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2009).
248. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1546 (1997) (stating that an employee gets the value of his or her
account when he or she retires).
249. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 19, at 6-15. Roth 401(k) plans receive
contributions from post-tax earnings. See id. at 6-20.
250. ERISA § 407(d)(6)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A) (2012).
251. See Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363,364 (1990)
(stating that an ESOP includes those "employee plans that invest in employer stock").
252. See id. at 364-65.
253. See Louis H. Diamond, Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings of
the 2003 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Employee
Benefits, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 213, 236 (2003) (explaining that a "KSOP is an
amalgamation of 401(k) and ESOP").
254. See id. (explaining that an employee uses a KSOP to defer part of her
compensation to be invested in company stock).
255. Id.
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a. 401(k) Plans
With that background on plan typology behind us, we can return
to the plan sponsor's role in selecting investment menus in the typical
401(k) plan and the use of employer stock for matching contributions.
Most 401(k) plans are participant-directed plans, which delegate to
employees decisions on investment selection.256 If the plan meets
certain regulatory requirements, including diversity in terms of the
risk/reward characteristics of the options and sufficient disclosure,
then plan sponsors and all fiduciaries, other than plan participants,
are insulated from fiduciary liability for the decision to invest account
assets in a particular investment product.5 Plan sponsors play an
important role in these plans because they typically determine which
investment vehicles are available to plan participants.258 Most plans
have a limited "menu" of available investments, with the average
number of options being eighteen.2 59
In addition to employers' decisions on the composition of the
plan's investment menu, employers that contribute to a 401(k) plan
may permit employees to invest their contributions in employer stock
(turning part of the plan into a KSOP).2x Or, an employer may make
contributions on behalf of participants in the form of employer
stock.26' Either use of employer stock will affect the investment
allocations in employee accounts.262
256. See Debra A. Davis, How Much Is Enough? Giving Fiduciaries and Participants
Adequate Information About Plan Expenses, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1005, 1008 (2008)
(explaining that approximately eighty-nine percent of 401(k) plans are participant-
directed at least in part).
257. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c5(b) (2013); see also Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between
Investment Advice and Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 10 (2002) ("[P~lans that delegate investment
decisionmaking to plan investors in compliance with the 404(c) requirements protect the
sponsoring employer from fiduciary liability associated with poor investment choices.").
258. See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision
to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
361, 381 (2002) ("By controlling which investment options are offered in a
plan ... employers retain significant control over employee choices.").
259. DELOITTE & INT'L FOUND., ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 5 (2011),
available at http://www.iscebs.org/Resources/Surveys/Documents/401 kSurvey_1 1.pdf.
260. See Diamond, supra note 253, at 236 (explaining that an employee uses a KSOP to
defer part of his compensation to be invested in company stock).
261. See Muir, supra note 257, at 15 (noting that employees allocate a larger
percentage of their voluntary contributions to employer stock where employers make
matching contributions using employer stock).
262. See id.
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The DOL's position is that a plan sponsor's selection and
monitoring of plan investments is a fiduciary function. The preamble
to the 1991 final regulation on participant-directed plans stated:
[T]he act of limiting or designating investment options which
are intended to constitute all or part of the investment universe
of a [participant-directed 401(k)] plan is a fiduciary
function ... whether achieved through fiduciary designation or
express plan language.... Thus,.. . the plan fiduciary has a
fiduciary obligation to prudently select such [investment
options], as well as a residual fiduciary obligation to
periodically evaluate the performance of such [investment
options].2'
Generally courts have agreed with the DOL and treated the
choice of investments for plan menus and employer matching as
fiduciary decisions,2" although, as we will discuss later, this position
seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding that plan
amendments are always settlor decisions. In analyzing whether
employers have met their fiduciary duties, particularly with respect to
continuing to allow purchases of employer stock, some courts have
found that the employer's decisions are entitled to some level of
deference.265 Some courts, however, limit this presumption to
situations where the plan's terms "require or encourage" the
availability of company stock as an investment. 26  This term the
Supreme Court will decide whether the potential application of any
presumption that might exist should be evaluated at the motion to
dismiss stage or as part of the merits.267 A full discussion of the
263. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans
(ERISA Section 404(c) Plans), 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 13, 1992) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5(b)(2) (2013) ("Nothing in
this [regulation] shall relieve a fiduciary from his or her duties under... ERISA to
prudently select and monitor any qualified default investment alternative under the plan
or from any liability that results from a failure to satisfy these duties, including liability for
any resulting losses.").
264. See supra text accompanying notes 256-58.
265. See, e.g., Quan v. Computer Scis. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2010)
(providing examples of courts that have given deference to employer's decisions with
respect to allowing purchases of company stock).
266. Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 717 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir.), withdrawn and superseded
on denial of reh'g en banc, 738 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated
and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (mem.); see also Taveras v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 436,
445 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that if a reference to employer stock in plan terms were
sufficient to give rise to the presumption of prudence, then the presumption would nearly
always apply).
267. See generally Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751, 2013 U.S. LEXIS
9024 (Dec. 13, 2013) (granting certiorari). The Supreme Court decided Dudenhoeffer on
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presumption of prudence and application of ERISA's fiduciary
standards to the selection of a plan's investment menu is beyond the
scope of this Article.26
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has put into
question the basic premise of the DOL's position, reserving decision
on whether a plan sponsor acts as a fiduciary when selecting
investments for its plan menu.269  In the court's words:
"We ... question whether [the plan sponsor's] decision to restrict the
direct investment choices in its Plans ... is even a decision within [the
plan sponsor's] fiduciary responsibilities."270
The Seventh Circuit's dicta may sweep even more broadly than
the usual application of the plan structure strand of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine. The court implied that a decision on the
composition of a plan's investment menu may not need to be
formalized in the plan documents, as is typical of the plan structure
cases, in order to be categorized as a settlor action."' The court
premised its skepticism about the employer's fiduciary status on its
view that the choice of investments for the plan's menu "bears more
resemblance to the basic structuring of a Plan than to its day-to-day
management."272 This arguably is consistent with the Hughes Court's
language stating that "decision[s] regarding the form or structure" of
a plan are generally settlor functions.273 And the Seventh Circuit's
reference to "day-to-day management"274 of plans links to the DOL's
June 25, 2014, after this Article was written. Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 134 S.
Ct. 2459 (2014). The Court did not reach the issue identified in the text but held that the
standard of prudence applicable to a fiduciary making investment decisions for an ESOP
was identical to that of a fiduciary in other contexts, except with the respect to the duty to
diversify. Id. at 2470-71. The Dudenhoeffer opinion also provides that plan terms cannot
override fiduciary obligations. Id. at 2468.
268. For an introduction to the issues, see generally Jos6 Martin Jara, What Is the
Correct Standard of Prudence in Employer Stock Cases?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 541
(2012); Craig C. Martin et al., What's Up on Stock-Drops? Moench Revisited, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 605 (2006).
269. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009).
270. Id. at 586-87. The plaintiffs had alleged that the employer breached its fiduciary
duty by offering investment options with excessive fees. Id. Even assuming, though, that
the plan sponsor's decisions were fiduciary decisions, the Seventh Circuit found that the
employer had not violated its fiduciary obligation because the fees varied across the
twenty-six investment options. Id.
271. See id. at 586.
272. Id.
273. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999).
274. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586.
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first information letter on the scope of settlor functions,275 which
distinguished as fiduciary activities "the management[] of plans." 27 6
b. ESOPs
Earlier we explained basic differences between 401(k) plans and
ESOPs. Beyond the decision to use employer stock, ESOPs give rise
to additional categories of settlor/fiduciary doctrine cases. Recall that
ESOPs employ a sort of turbo version of the use of employer stock; as
a statutory requirement, ESOPs must invest primarily in employer
securities. The concentration of their investments in employer stock
means that ESOPs are rife with potential conflicts of interest; the
creation of an ESOP may benefit the company whose shares were
sold to the ESOP, an acquirer of that company who uses an ESOP to
fund the acquisition, or a shareholder, such as a company founder,
who sells stock to the ESOP. In spite of the inherent dangers of self-
interested transactions, courts have consistently applied the plan
structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine to determine that a
decision to establish an ESOP is, like the decision to establish any
other type of employee benefit plan, not a fiduciary decision.2 77 One
275. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18 (discussing the DOL information
letter).
276. Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114.
277. Neil v. Zell, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding that board
members who decided to establish ESOP did not become fiduciaries as a result of that
decision). Every ESOP, however, must have a named fiduciary and that fiduciary must
ensure that the ESOP acquires employer stock at an appropriate valuation. Id. at 1018. As
the Neil court stated: "Case law imposes on an ESOP fiduciary a still more demanding
duty of prudence than a typical ERISA fiduciary because an ESOP holds employer stock
only, making diversification impossible." Id. at 1019 (citations omitted). As discussed
above regarding the use of the Moench presumption, which was initially developed in the
ESOP context, in 401(k) plans, the analysis of whether a named fiduciary has met
ERISA's standard of care is a different question from whether there is a fiduciary
obligation. See, e.g., Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
employer's "decision to establish an ESOP and to fund it with newly-issued stock was the
act of a settlor. .. "); Chesemore v. Alliance Holdings, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1040
(W.D. Wis. 2012) ("Employers who sponsor ESOPs wear 'two hats,' acting... as an
employer to the extent [that] they engage in settlor functions such as establishing, funding,
amending or terminating the trust."); Beauchem v. Rockford Prods. Corp., No. 01-C-
50134, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5546, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting argument that
employer sponsoring ESOP was a fiduciary). In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134
S. Ct. 2459 (2014), decided after this Article was written, the Supreme Court ruled that the
standard of prudent care for fiduciaries in ESOP cases was, apart from the duty to
diversify investments, identical to that in any other case. Id. at 2463.
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of the particularly vexing issues from a fiduciary standpoint has been
the valuation of stock purchased by an ESOP. 278
Once an ESOP is established and holds employer stock, a
question arises whether company officers who also act as ESOP
fiduciaries are wearing their fiduciary or settlor hats when making
decisions that may affect the value of that employer. In many
instances an ESOP owns a high percentage, sometimes one hundred
percent, of the company's issued stock." 9 Because all or most of the
value of the ESOP accounts is attributable to employer stock,
business-related decisions that affect the price of that stock obviously
have a particularly strong effect on the value of employees' ESOP
accounts at such companies.
One court confronted the issue of whether a particular decision
was a business decision or fiduciary decision after ESOP participants
alleged that the executives who were named fiduciaries of the ESOP
violated ERISA's fiduciary standards because they paid themselves
excessive compensation.' The company's overpayment of
compensation allegedly caused dividends paid on the stock held by
the ESOP to be lower than they otherwise would have been.28 In
rejecting the participants' claim of fiduciary breach, the court wrote:
Setting compensation levels is a business decision or judgment
made in connection with the on-going operation of a
business.... Such a decision may ultimately affect a plan
indirectly but it does not implicate fiduciary concerns regarding
plan administration or assets. Business decisions can still be
made for business reasons, notwithstanding their collateral
effect on prospective, contingent employee benefits.282
Without using the term "settlor," the court, in effect, applied the
business decision strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.
The settlor/fiduciary doctrine cannot be stretched so far,
however, as to protect a decision by a company's president and board
278. See, e.g., Sam J. Totino, Note, The Importance of Proper Valuation in Transactions
Between an ESOP and the Selling Owner, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 361,
370-81 (2011) (discussing general and specific issues associated with ESOP valuation).
279. Norman Stein, Three and Possibly Four Lessons About ERISA That We Should,
but Probably Will Not, Learn from Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 855, 860 (2002)
("[T]here are more than ten thousand ESOPs in which virtually one hundred percent of
plan assets are invested in employer stock.").
280. Eckelkamp v. Beste, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1013-14 (E.D. Mo.) (finding that
plaintiffs' expert's testimony was insufficient to establish breach of fiduciary duty), aff'd,
315 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2002).
281. Id. at 1014.
282. Id. at 1023.
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members, who served as ESOP trustees, to buy out the president's
deferred compensation agreements for a sum that exceeded a third of
the company's value.8 The Ninth Circuit rejected the trustees'
argument that compensation decisions are business, not fiduciary,
decisions.28 According to the court, the distinction between the
typical business decision that might implicate stock value, which
would be protected by the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, and the instant
situation was the direct profit to the company president.2 85 In the
court's view, application of fiduciary duties in this context "does not
risk encompassing within its confines any and all day-to-day corporate
decisions shielded by the business judgment rule."2" This decision
raises as many questions as it answers. It is not clear how the court
distinguished between "direct profit" to the company president,
which would be evaluated as an ERISA fiduciary decision due to its
potential implications for stock value, and "normal" compensation,
which presumably would be a business decision. Perhaps, somewhat
like the Supreme Court's decision in Varity Corp., the distinction
turns on whether the action is so egregious that it offends the court.2 87
3. Welfare Benefit Plan Decisions
Health care and other welfare benefit plans, such as disability
plans, give rise to sometimes difficult decisions about whether a plan
covers specific health treatments or whether a claimant's disability
meets the plan's criteria for benefits. In Pegram v. Herdich,2" the
question of whether the decision maker acted as a fiduciary
intersected with the denial of a participant's entitlement to a
particular health care treatment. 289 In Pegram, a physician-owned
health maintenance organization ("HMO") created a conflict of
interest with its patients by using financial incentives to encourage its
physicians to ration medical care.2" After one of the HMO's
physicians delayed a patient's treatment, the patient sued on the
theory that the HMO's incentives constituted a violation of ERISA's
fiduciary standards.29'
283. Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009).
284. Id. at 1077.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Supreme Court decisions that may fit this pattern).
288. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
289. Id. at 211-14.
290. Id. at 215, 226.
291. Id.
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The Court, in effect, addressed the issue of whether the decision
to delay treatment was a fiduciary decision or was protected by a
version of the business decision strand of the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine.2 " The Court explained that "the analogy between ERISA
fiduciary and [the] common law trustee becomes problematic"
because "the trustee under ERISA may wear different hats." 293
According to basic settlor/fiduciary doctrine principles, an employer
could adopt a health care plan that contained payment incentives
equivalent to those established by the HMO.294 Here, though, it was
the HMO making the decision.
In its analysis of what it characterized as the mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions made by the HMO through its physicians, the
Court looked once again to trust law and determined that the
treatment portion of the physician's decisions bore little to no
likeness to the typical decisions made by trustees. 295 Thus, the mixed
decisions made by physicians do not constitute ERISA fiduciary
decisions.296 The Court's deference to the right of physicians to make
treatment decisions qua physician parallels the right of employers to
make business decisions while wearing their business hats, even
where those decisions have an effect on employee benefits.297
As a general matter, in contrast to the situation presented in
Pegram, discretionary decisions on the payment of health care and
other welfare benefit claims are fiduciary decisions. 298 According to
well-established doctrine, a plan sponsor may, in the terms of a
benefit plan, grant discretion to the plan administrator that makes
benefit decisions.299 Where plans clearly grant discretion, courts
review eligibility decisions using an abuse of discretion standard;
otherwise they use a de novo standard.' As with the ESOP situation,
292. See id. at 214.
293. Id. at 225.
294. Id. at 226-27.
295. Id. at 231-32.
296. Id. at 237.
297. A patient could, of course, bring a malpractice action under state law against a
physician, but there would be a substantial preemption question to the extent that the
physician denies treatment based on plan eligibility provisions. See supra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text (discussing ERISA preemption).
298. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219-21 (2004) (limiting Pegram's
application to situations where physicians or the HMO make both a treatment and an
eligibility decision).
299. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989).
300. See, e.g., Cosey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 735 F.3d 161, 165 (4th Cir. 2013)
("In the ERISA context, courts conduct de novo review of an administrator's denial of
benefits unless the plan grants the administrator discretion to determine a claimant's
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however, conflicts of interest are inherent in situations where the
same entity determines whether a participant is eligible for a benefit
and bears the financial cost of paying that benefit. As a result, the
Supreme Court has determined that the existence of such conflicts is
among the factors to be considered in determining whether a
fiduciary abused its discretion in denying a claim for benefits.3 0'
In some instances, benefit plans seek to recover benefits they
paid to or on behalf of plan participants. Health care plans typically
include provisions permitting the plan to recover the cost of health
care benefits provided to a participant who is injured in an accident
and subsequently receives an award or settlement from the tortfeasor
that caused the accident or the tortfeasor's insurance company.302
Three Supreme Court decisions have addressed whether ERISA's
remedial provisions permit the health plan's recovery, with the
application of the remedial provisions being highly fact dependent?
ERISA's remedial provisions are complex, and a number of scholars
have penned thoughtful critiques of them.'
For purposes of this Article, rather than delve into the vagaries
of the remedial doctrine, it is sufficient to consider the most recent
Supreme Court decision on ERISA remedies, U.S. Airways v.
eligibility for benefits, in which case the administrator's decision is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.").
301. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 116-17 (2008); see also Conkright v.
Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1649 (2010) (holding that a plan administrator's second
interpretation was entitled to deference where the administrator had made an honest
mistake in its first interpretation).
302. See, e.g., U.S. Airways v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1542 (2013); see also
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 19, at 14-21 ("ERISA health care benefit plans
typically include both a subrogation clause and a reimbursement clause . . .. ").
303. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1867 (2011) (finding that the district
court was authorized to reform and enforce the terms of an ERISA pension plan for use as
a remedy); Sereboff v. Mid-AtI. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (finding that
recovery was possible against a separate trust established pending resolution of the health
care plan's claim); Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002)
(holding that the health care plan could not recover from a special needs trust established
in an insurance settlement on behalf of the participant).
304. See, e.g., Roger M. Baron & Anthony P. Lamb, The Revictimization of Personal
Injury Victims by ERISA Subrogation Claims, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 325,325-26 (2012);
Susan Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law "Make-
Whole" Relief Is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 721-24
(2008); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail
of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 CoLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1317 (2003);
Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of "Equitable" Relief Under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 827, 829 (2006); Muir, supra note 95, at 14-15;
Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 131, 131 (2009).
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McCutchen.0 The Court took up the issue of whether plan
participants are able to rely on the equitable "double recovery" and
"common fund" doctrines, which are equitable doctrines that are
relevant to state insurance law,31 to defeat health insurance plan
terms intended to permit recoveries of benefits paid to participants.30
The background story was sad and simple-it is the scenario in the
opening section of this Article. " Mr. McCutchen's health insurance
covered substantial medical costs that resulted when he was
profoundly injured in an automobile accident.' The plan demanded
a reimbursement from Mr. McCutchen that exceeded the amount he
received after attorney's fees in a tort suit.310 In summary, as will be
detailed in the next paragraphs, he argued that (1) he should be able
to raise equitable principles to limit the plan's recovery; and (2) in any
event, the plan should not be able to recover in excess of the
participant's recovery net of attorney's fees.
Mr. McCutchen cited two equitable doctrines. The common fund
doctrine provides that if an attorney recovers monies on behalf of
third parties, then the attorney's fees should be paid from the
recovery.31' The double recovery doctrine permits insurers to recover
expenses only from any excess that the insured obtains through a
private claim over the insured's total loss. 3 12 The U.S. Airways health
care plan required participants "to reimburse [U.S. Airways] for
amounts paid for claims out of any monies recovered from [the] third
305. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537.
306. See, e.g., Mark T. Flickinger, Protecting the Insured in Utah: Rethinking the
"Interstitial" Approach of Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 12 BYU
J. PUB. L. 389, 389-90 (1998) (discussing the application of equitable doctrines to
insurance contracts).
307. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1542-43. The issue had split the circuits. Compare Zurich
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. O'Hara, 604 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that equitable
defenses are not available), Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.' Health &
Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 838-39 (8th Cir. 2007) (same), Admin. Comm. of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.' Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.
2003) (same), and Bombardier Aerospace Emp. Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot &
Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 361 (5th Cir. 2003) (same), with CGI Tech. & Solutions Inc. v.
Rose, 683 F.3d 1113, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that plan participants may defend
using either the common-fund or make-whole doctrine), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct.
1995 (2013), and U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 673 (3d Cir. 2011) (same),
vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
309. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1543.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 1545.
312. Id.
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party .... "I" Based on this language, U.S. Airways sought to recover
the entire amount it had paid for the participant's medical expenses
even though the participant still had not been made whole and the
participant would have to pay out-of-pocket the attorney's fees
associated with the settlement.314
The Supreme Court used a contract analysis to find that the
plan's language precluded application of the double recovery doctrine
and remanded for a determination of whether the language also
negated the common fund doctrine.315 According to the Court:
"Courts construe ERISA plans, as they do other contracts, by
'looking to the terms of the plan' as well as to 'other manifestations of
the parties' intent.' ""6 The U.S. Airways decision has important
implications for plan terms in addition to those that permit plans to
recover medical benefits. As we will explain in the next section, the
Supreme Court's decision implies that a plan may enforce any written
terms that are not directly inconsistent with ERISA's requirements,
suggesting few legal limits on onerous plan terms.
4. Benefit Structures-Different Benefits for Different Participants
Since at least 1964, the United States has expanded federal
statutory prohibitions against workplace discrimination.'" ERISA,
however, continues to permit employers to engage in arbitrary line
drawing among employees with respect to their benefit eligibility.'
The plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine typically
protects an employer's right to distinguish among employees so long
as the line drawing is not in direct conflict with ERISA or IRC
313. Id. at 1543 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
314. See id.
315. Id. at 1551.
316. Id. at 1549 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113
(1989)). Professor Langbein has explained that trusts have a contractarian aspect. John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 650-52 (1995).
ERISA's dual nature, which incorporates both trust and contract law, poses a variety of
challenges for the courts. See, e.g., Killian v. Concert Health Plan, No. 11-1112, 2013 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22657, at *34, *59 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (finding that the claim was
fiduciary in nature, as compared to Judge Posner's view that it was a contract-type claim).
This issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
317. See generally Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal
Employment Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 25 (2011) (discussing the development of federal discrimination law, particularly Title
VII). The statement that protections have expanded since 1964 is not to imply that the
authors believe discrimination protections are sufficient. See id. at 50-73 (discussing issues
with relying on categories to define those entitled to protections).
318. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 319-36.
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requirements 9 or federal nondiscrimination provisions, such as that
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.320
Not surprisingly then, participants have been unsuccessful with
allegations that employers breached their fiduciary duty by adopting
plan amendments that draw distinctions perceived as unfair by some
participants. One employer adopted a plan amendment that granted
early retirement benefits to a handful of recently laid-off
employees.32' The employer did not extend those benefits to other
similarly, but not equivalently, situated laid-off employees.3 22 Because
the employer amended the plan to provide the benefits to the
subgroup of former employees, the benefit change was a settlor
decision and not subject to fiduciary challenge.32 3 This is the type of
plan amendment that T&B arguably could have adopted in Noorily v.
Thomas & Betts Corp.,324 where it denied severance benefits to
certain employees who refused to relocate. If T&B had taken the
approach of formally amending its plan, the plan structure strand of
the settlor/fiduciary doctrine would have applied. The outcome of the
case would have been unchanged-T&B's actions would have been
valid settlor actions. Another court confirmed that an employer's
amendment of its severance pay plan to eliminate benefits for
employees who refused to join a successor employer was a settlor act
even though it was taken in conjunction with the employer's sale of a
business unit to that successor employer.325 Consider the selling
employer's two-fold conflict of interest. First, the amendment
decreased the amount of severance benefits that employer owed.
Second, that employer could demand a higher price for the business
unit because of the increased likelihood that the successor employer
would be able to retain the unit's workforce. Yet the employer's
conflict of interest played no role in assessing the employer's
obligation; the employer acted as a settlor when it amended the
plan.326 Spink and Hughes are variations on this theme, with the
employers using the plan amendments to facilitate downsizing.327
319. Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System
and the Principles and Values It Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 5,41-42 (2011).
320. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
321. Schultz v. Windstream Commc'ns, 600 F.3d 948,950 (8th Cir. 2010).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 952.
324. 188 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999). Noorily is discussed supra at text accompanying notes
177-85.
325. Campbell v. BankBoston, 327 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2003).
326. See id.
327. See supra text accompanying footnotes 129-41.
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Broader scale changes to benefit plans also may affect various
employee cohorts in different ways. For example, a significant
number of plan sponsors with DB plans have converted those plans to
cash balance plans.328 An understanding of the technicalities of those
conversions is not necessary here.329 The point for this Article is that
the conversions tend to defeat the benefit expectations of long- and
middle-term service employees, leaving them disproportionately
worse off 'than shorter service employees.330 Because the plan
conversions are accomplished through the mechanism of a plan
amendment, the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine
protects them from fiduciary challenge.33'
ERISA and the IRC provide some limitations on employers'
ability to favor some employees over others in benefit plans. The IRS
requirements limit the amount of benefits that can go to highly
compensated employees as compared to nonhighly compensated
employees.332 ERISA's nondiscrimination provision, section 510,
prohibits anyone, including an employer, from taking specified
actions, such as termination of employment, against benefit plan
participants in retaliation for exercising benefit rights or in order to
prevent them from liecoming entitled to benefits. 333 As a result, it is a
violation of ERISA to fire an individual employee or the workforce at
an entire plant in order to avoid the payment of benefits.334
Although section 510 operates as a constraint on an employer's
ability to make business decisions, namely to make employment
328. KRAVITZ, 2012 NATIONAL CASH BALANCE RESEARCH REPORT 3 (2012),
available at http://cashbalancedesign.com/articles/documents/NationalCashBalance
ResearchReport2012.pdf ("Many larger corporations converted existing defined benefit
plans to Cash Balance .... ").
329. For an explanation of cash balance plans, see EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra
note 19, at 2-8.
330. See generally Joshua Rauh, Irina Stefanescu, & Stephen Zeldes, Cost Shifting and
the Freezing of Corporate Pension Plans, in FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION
SERIES, DIVISIONS OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS 2 (2013),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201382/201382pap.pdf
(demonstrating that the largest benefit goes to "middle-aged employees who plan to stay
with the firms until retirement").
331. Campbell, 327 F.3d at 6 (applying explicitly the settlor/fiduciary doctrine to
amendment of a separation pay plan but implicitly also applying it to permit conversion of
a traditional pension plan to a cash balance plan); see also Muir, supra note 7, at 214-16.
332. Moore, supra note 319, at 41-42.
333. ERISA § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012).
334. See Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989) (allowing claim for
retaliation by discharged employee); Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1570 (D.
Utah 1992) (finding that USX violated ERISA section 510 when it closed two facilities in
order to avoid its pension costs).
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decisions based on benefit plan costs,335 the settlor/fiduciary doctrine
provides employers with another option: amend the plan to achieve
the same result. For example, an employer reduced the lifetime cap in
its health insurance plan from $1,000,000 to $5,000 for expenses
related to AIDS shortly after learning that one of its employees had
contracted AIDS. 3 Because the reduction applied to all employees
who might file AIDS-related claims, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals accepted the employer's explanation that its motivation was
to reduce the costs of its health care plan and that it was not
impermissibly targeting the specific employee.337 This was almost
certainly not entirely true, for it is obvious, at least to these authors,
that other medical conditions could impose similarly devastating costs
on the plan, yet the' plan narrowly carved out expenses related to
AIDS.338 The case might also be read to hold that a decision to amend
the plan, no matter what the effect or intent, is simply not an action
covered by section 510.
5. Fundamental Corporate Changes
When companies engage in fundamental corporate changes, such
as mergers, acquisitions, or dispositions, those changes may result in
modifications to benefit plans that affect an entire workforce or a
subset of employees. The doctrinal results are similar to those
discussed in the prior subsection. As evidenced in the case discussed
in the next paragraph, courts may uphold an employer's right, relying
on the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, to amend
plans in the context of fundamental corporate changes, even when a
plan amendment makes arbitrary distinctions among employees or
groups of employees. In other cases, courts categorize the employer's
decision as a business decision, and thus free of ERISA fiduciary
constraints, even though that business decision may have significant
effects on employee benefit plans. 339
In a case, Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,3 that predated the
Supreme Court's Hughes decision, the Sixth Circuit decided that the
335. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
336. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,403 (5th Cir. 1991).
337. Id. at 405-08. The decision might be read as leaving open the question of whether
using the amendment power to target a specific employee is a section 510 violation.
338. See, e.g., Rene6 M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Employment Benefits: Will
Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 379 (2000) ("The
cost of treating AIDS has fallen to approximately $100,000 per case, while the cost of
treating a premature baby can rise as high as $1 million." (citations omitted)).
339. See infra text accompanying notes 340-43.
340. 156 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 1998).
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plan sponsor did not act as a fiduciary when it drew arbitrary
distinctions among retirees as part of a spin-off." When B.F.
Goodrich ("Goodrich") spun off its tire operations, the new entity
assumed the pension and welfare benefit obligations for the active
and retired employees of those operations. 42 Goodrich transferred
approximately forty-two percent of its headquarters retirees to the
new pension and welfare benefit plans since the tire operations had
constituted that percentage of Goodrich's total operations? The
company determined which retirees would be transferred by looking
to the last four digits of their social security numbers." Those retirees
with numbers ending in 4254 or lower were transferred, while those
with higher numbers remained in the Goodrich plan.345
Nine years later the company that had assumed the welfare
benefit obligations of the retirees assigned to the spin-off reduced
those retirees' health and life insurance benefits.'6 The retirees
alleged, among other things, that Goodrich had violated its ERISA
fiduciary obligations when it arbitrarily assigned retirees to the new
entity.3 47 The Sixth Circuit rejected the retirees' Varity Corp.-based
argument that assigning retirees to the transferred plans was a
discretionary act of plan management or administration and, thus, a
fiduciary act.' According to the court, "the exercise of discretion
alone"" does not cause an act to be a fiduciary act. Instead, the plan
sponsor's acts must involve carrying out the plan purposes or
discretion with respect to plan administration or management.5 0 The
Sixth Circuit then opined that "the actions undertaken by [Goodrich]
to implement its business decision were simply not the kind of plan
management or administration that trigger ERISA's fiduciary
duties.""'
More recent decisions have consistently upheld the right of
employers to make decisions in the context of fundamental corporate
changes free of ERISA's fiduciary constraints, even where the
decisions affect benefit plans. For example, when General Electric
341. Id. at 662-63.
342. Id. at 663.
343. Id. at 663-64.
344. See id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 664.
347. See id. at 665-66.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 666.
350. Id.
351. Id.
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Company ("GE") sold a defense division to Martin Marietta Corp.,
GE transferred pension assets from its overfunded DB plan to Martin
Marietta's DB plan to offset benefit promises Martin Marietta would
make to the former GE employees it hired.352 Former GE employees
brought a variety of fiduciary challenges related to GE's transfer of
those assets. 3 53 One of those claims alleged that GE violated its
fiduciary duty of loyalty to pension plan participants by transferring
more pension assets than liabilities to Martin Marietta and, in return,
getting a higher sale price for the division.3 54 According to the court,
however, "GE's decision to spin-off the division along with its
pension plan was, at its core, a corporate business decision, and not
one of a plan administrator, [therefore] GE was acting as a settlor,
not a fiduciary, when it transferred the surplus to [Martin
Marietta]." 355
6. Inadequate or Misleading Disclosures to Plan Participants
As explained above,356 the Supreme Court held in Varity Corp. v.
Howe that the employer acted as a fiduciary, and not a plan sponsor,
when communicating with employees about the benefits they could
expect if they voluntarily transferred to a new subsidiary.' In
subsequent cases challenging the accuracy of communications, courts
have typically followed Varity Corp. in holding that the
communicator is a fiduciary so long as the communications are
intentionally or closely connected to employee benefits.5 Where,
however, the communications are more attenuated from employee
benefit plans, courts may apply the business decision strand of the
352. Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2001).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 87.
355. Id. at 88; see also Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 719 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding decisions as to the staffing level needed to transfer plan assets and transferring
plan assets as company stock to be business decisions).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 186-202.
357. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1996).
358. See, e.g., Bouboulis v. Transp. Workers Union, 442 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that "if the plaintiffs can establish that [defendant]. made intentional
misrepresentations" about benefits, they would establish a fiduciary claim), dismissed on
other grounds, No. 03 Civ. 0373 (SAS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74238, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
11, 2006); In re Gen. Growth Props., No.08 CV 6680, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *27
(N.D. Ill. May 6, 2010) ("Communications are fiduciary in nature only if statements are
'intentionally connected' to benefits."); see also In re Wachovia Corp. ERISA Litig., No.
3:09cv262, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79971, at *53 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2010) (citation
omitted) ("In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the Supreme Court held that statements about a
company's financial condition become subject to ERISA's fiduciary duties only if
they ... are intentionally connected to statements about a plan's benefits.").
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settlor/fiduciary doctrine to determine that communications are not
subject to ERISA's fiduciary obligations. 5 1
For example, participants in one 401(k) plan alleged that public
statements made by the company via a variety of fora, such as
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings and press
releases, were misleading and in violation of fiduciary obligations
owed by various individuals who were fiduciaries of the company's
401(k) plan." The court decided, in what it believed to be the then-
current trend, that SEC filings are made in a corporate capacity, not
an ERISA fiduciary capacity, even though the plan incorporated the
filings by reference."6 ' Similarly, the court rejected the claims based
on some of the defendants' public statements on the grounds that
those statements also were made in a corporate capacity. According
to the court: "Communications are fiduciary in nature only if
statements are 'intentionally connected' to benefits."362
The court also determined that employees who held company
stock in the 401(k) plan did not have any right to disclosures about
the company's allegedly "precarious financial condition and the real
risk that it might collapse under the weight of its reckless business
practices." 363 The court noted that the defendants' nondisclosure was
a "byproduct of keeping such information from creditors and
competitors." 3  And, requiring such disclosures to plan participants
could " 'distur[b] the carefully delineated corporate disclosure
laws.' "365
359. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
360. Gen. Growth Props., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *8-9.
361. Id. at *16; see also In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., No. 07 Civ. 9790, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78055, at *72-73 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009) ("[E]merging case law makes clear that
those 'who prepare SEC filings do not become ERISA fiduciaries through those acts.' "),
affd, 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011). But see Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d
410, 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (reviewing Sixth Circuit cases in which a majority "found that
incorporation of SEC filings into plan documents is a fiduciary act").
362. Gen. Growth Props., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *17. But see In re Sprint
Corp. ERISA Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1227 (D. Kan. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss
on basis that statements of CEO, board chair, president, and COO made in company
newsletter to employees could be made in fiduciary capacity); Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp.
2d 157, 173-74 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that employees may be able to show that six
communications by the CEO to employees explaining the company's general economic
position were made wearing a fiduciary hat).
363. Gen. Growth Props., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *28--29.
364. Id. at *31-32.
365. Id.
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7. Claims Processing and Review
While ERISA does require that a plan have a full and fair review
process,3 " the statute itself does not specify the requirements for such
a review process. In addition, ERISA does not include a statute of
limitations for benefit claims. The DOL has partly filled the first gap
by promulgating regulations on the meaning of full and fair review,"'
and the courts have filled in the second gap by holding that
comparable state limitations periods and federal tolling principles
control.6 Some plans, however, have sought to vary the limitations
period and to augment the regulations with specific plan provisions.
In 2013 the Supreme Court considered the issue where an employer's
disability plan required that a claimant file a disability proof of claim
within three years of " 'the time written proof of loss is required to be
furnished according to the terms of the policy.' "36' But for the plan
provision, the statute of limitations would not have been triggered
until the plan denied the claim.370 The Court unanimously held that
the terms of the plan were enforceable.71
In sum, this Part explains that the courts' application of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine can be divided into two major strands: the
plan structure strand and the business decision strand. After
establishing the basic parameters of the two strands, the Part
enumerates a wide variety of employee benefit situations to which the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine applies. The next Part shows that this
central doctrine that crosses so many areas of employee benefits plans
is inconsistent at times with ERISA's complex statutory provisions
and policy compromises.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE SETTLOR/FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE
The settlor/fiduciary doctrine draws a formal distinction between
business and fiduciary conduct. ERISA applies to the latter conduct
but not the former, which because of ERISA preemption is ordinarily
subject only to specific ERISA constraints on plan design in areas
366. See ERISA § 503,29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2012).
367. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a)-(b) (2013). The Affordable Care Act contains new
claims and review requirements for certain group health care plans. See generally Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
368. See, e.g., Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 322-23 (2d Cir.
2004) (applying federal tolling principles).
369. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 609 (2013)
(quoting plan terms).
370. See id. at *12-13.
371. Id. at *30.
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such as vesting and benefit accrual.372 Business conduct affecting
employee benefit plans can be separated into two strands: (1) conduct
involving the design and termination of plans (traditional settlor
functions) and (2) traditional business decisions.
Both the Supreme Court and the DOL have identified three
areas of conduct that are conclusively settlor functions: adopting a
plan, amending a plan, and terminating a plan.373 We can simplify
these three by noting that, in a system of voluntary benefit plan
sponsorship, adoption of a plan is by definition a voluntary,
unreviewable action and that is obvious and noncontroversial. But the
acts of adopting a plan, amending a plan, and terminating a plan share
functional DNA, for each is a formal mechanism by which an
employer implements or alters or ends a plan's written design, which
includes the definition of plan benefits, the conditions for benefit
eligibility, and the prerogatives and responsibilities of the plan
sponsor and the plan's participants. One can say, then, that settlor
functions are in essence actions that implement two sets of choices:
first, the binary choice of having a plan or not having a plan (which is
effected through plan adoption and through plan termination); and
second, the almost infinite number of choices that shape a plan's
design (which is effected through both plan adoption and through
plan amendment). Under the plan structure strand of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine, these choices belong to the employer and
are neither constrained by, nor subject to review under, ERISA's
fiduciary rules.374
Committing these functions to the business rather than fiduciary
judgment of the plan sponsor has considerable surface appeal. On an
abstract level, it reflects the business autonomy of the employer in a
system that makes entry into the system voluntary. It allows the
employer to consider business purposes and business goals in its plan-
related decisions. And on a practical level, it often, if not generally,
provides an easy, mechanical test to demarcate conduct subject to
ERISA's fiduciary rules. Moreover, for the overwhelming number of
events in the life of a plan, the settlor/fiduciary distinction produces
outcomes that are unequivocally correct, events that neither cause
controversy nor produce litigation.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 64, 73-75.
373. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999); Letter from
Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114.
374. See supra Part I.A.
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In this section of the Article we review some problems with the
doctrine, problems that we foreshadowed in the Article's earlier
sections. These problems are significant enough to suggest that the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine has not served the statute well, in large
measure because it obscures difficult policy judgments, creates
structural problems in the statutory architecture, and has unintended
consequences in a surprising array of situations. Moreover, as we
have already discussed, the scope of the doctrine is blurry at its edges,
undermining one of the appealing aspects of the doctrine: the ease of
application suggested by a superficial examination of its focus on plan
adoption, amendment, and termination.
The fact that a doctrine produces problems, even serious
problems, is not, of course, a condemnation of the courts and agencies
that developed it if the doctrine was compelled, or at least strongly
implied, by the statute's language and structure. Thus, in this section,
we also critique the statutory basis for the doctrine. Our conclusion is
that, while the statute did imply a version of the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine, the Supreme Court's expansive and rigid iteration of the
doctrine was inconsistent with the statute's structure and not
compelled by the statute's language.
A. Problems with the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine
We have already suggested through specific contexts that the
settlor/fiduciary distinction, at least as interpreted by the federal
courts, is not entirely free of problems. In this section, we attempt to
identify the central concerns that we have with the doctrine,
essentially moving from the specific to the general. We have grouped
our concerns into three categories: (1) concerns related to employee
expectations; (2) concerns related to undermining ERISA
protections; and (3) concerns related to the creation of regulatory
voids, particularly in welfare plans.
We want to make four initial points, however, before proceeding
to these concerns.
First, as we have already observed, the Supreme Court has
rejected the idea of an employee as co-settlor of an employee benefit
plan, even when the plan itself was funded primarily (and we assume
even if it were funded exclusively) by voluntary employee
contributions .3 To us, the result in a case such as Jacobson v. Hughes
seems unjust, but this is our subjective sense of fair play speaking.
375. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's position that a plan participant is, in essence,
contracting for a specific benefit and not for a right to the underlying
plan assets 76 is a plausible overlay to the statute, particularly in the
type of plan in which the ultimate risk of underfunding falls, at least
nominally, on the employer. Besides, a workable contrary rule-that
the fiduciary must consider and balance the competing interests of
employer and employee-would be difficult to fashion and difficult
for both fiduciaries and courts to apply. Thus, for purposes of this
section, we do not list failure to consider the employee as co-settlor as
a concern.377
Second, accepting the notion that the employee is not a settlor
does not mean, however, that we reject the interests of plan
participants as a legitimate policy and statutory concern, particularly
in three contexts. First, one of ERISA's central themes is that the
employee should be able to rely (or at least reasonably rely) upon the
promises contained in an employee benefit plan and that the plan
should provide sufficient information for the employee to understand
what is promised and what is not promised. The settlor/fiduciary
doctrine sometimes allows the employer to change or abandon
promises midstream, and this, in our view, can be problematic in
some situations-for example, when employees had a reasonable
reliance interest on the promise. Second, ERISA is intended to
protect employee interests through its fiduciary rules,3" through its
enforcement provisions, and through its substantive standards." The
settlor/fiduciary doctrine is problematic to the extent that it allows the
employer to reduce these intended statutory protections for
participants in employee benefit plans. Third, the settlor function
should not shield the employer from misleading the employees. While
the Supreme Court in Varity Corp. held that the employer could not
deliberately mislead employees,3" the settlor/fiduciary function would
allow the employer to amend the plan and not inform employees of
the potentially adverse impact of the amendments on them. We
return to this problem in the concluding section of the Article.
376. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
377. This is an issue that in an ideal world Congress might want to consider.
378. John Langbein and Daniel Fischel have argued that trust law is an awkward legal
framework for employee benefit plans. Trust law was developed in the context of private,
donative trusts, which were traditionally irrevocable and where the settlor was in any
event often deceased. See Fischel and Langbein, supra note 2, at 1105.
379. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
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Our third preliminary point relates to the lack of clarity in parts
of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine and the difficulty this poses for courts.
Although the settlor/fiduciary doctrine is often easy to apply, we have
noted two areas in which courts have experienced difficulty and in
which they will likely continue to have difficulty: first, in
distinguishing settlor decisions from implementation decisions and,
second, in determining when the employer is acting in a nonfiduciary
capacity outside orthodox settlor functions (adopting, amending, or
terminating a plan). This includes situations in which the plan sponsor
takes actions equivalent to a plan amendment and situations in which
the sponsor acts in its business rather than settlor capacity.381
These parts of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine may pose difficulties
for courts and plan administrators, but any limitations on the scope of
the settlor/fiduciary doctrine will pose difficulties, so this does not
seem grounds to object to the doctrine itself. Indeed, in the final
section of this Article, in which we suggest judicial strategies to limit
some of the problems of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, we focus on
how these judicial limitations might be usefully adapted to address
concerns about the doctrine's problems.
Fourth, the policy concerns justifying the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine-that in a voluntary pension system employers will not play
unless they have considerable flexibility-has considerably more
resonance in a defined benefit world, where the employer bore heavy
risks: inflation risk, longevity risk, investment risk, and balance-sheet
risk. Managing those risks justifies giving employers reasonable
flexibility, which the fiduciary/settlor doctrine accommodates. As we
have moved to a defined contribution world where those risks have
either been shifted to plan participants or dissipated, the policy
underpinnings of the doctrine are considerably weaker.382
1. Formalism, Contracts of Adhesion, and Employee Expectations
The difference between pension as contract and pension as
gratuity has been a theme of employee benefits law for more than a
century, and ERISA is sometimes reckoned to be the culmination of
an evolutionary move from employee benefit plan as gratuity to
employee benefit plan as contract."' There are, of course, some
conceptual problems with the contract paradigm because employee
381. In some instances the plan sponsor may be doing both.
382. We owe this insight to Professor John Langbein, who commented on a draft of
this Article.
383. For a brief description of this history, see Moore, supra note 319, at 25-26.
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benefit plans are typically not the bilateral product of active
bargaining by the parties but rather are drafted by the employer
without direct, and certainly not individual, negotiation with the
employees. The resulting issues are not unique to employee benefit
plans; they are common to all contracts of adhesion. And by the time
ERISA had evolved, concerns about contracts of adhesion were
addressed judicially by a common-law approach favoring the
consumer over the drafter in matters of interpretation and
administratively by the adoption of particular statutory measures to
counter unambiguous contractual provisions that violated public
policy.3*
ERISA did include minimum standards for pension plans,
which can be likened to the legislative approach to limiting contracts
of adhesion, but federal courts have been resistant to adopting modes
of contractual interpretation to ERISA plans that construed plan
provisions in favor of the plan participants-i.e., the consumer.386
Employee benefit plans generally include two types of clauses
that exploit this judicial reluctance to construe pension plans as
contracts of adhesion: reservation of rights clauses and clauses
providing plan administrators with discretionary interpretative
authority over the contract. The discretionary clauses shield an
administrator's contractual interpretations from the de novo judicial
review accorded to most contracts that arise from bilateral
bargaining.
In effect, these clauses, which are design clauses that appear in
the plan document either at initial adoption or plan amendment, turn
the normal judicial approach to interpreting unilateral contracts on its
head. The plan sponsor is bound by nothing that is not mandated by
ERISA's minimum standards; a reservation of rights clause" allows
384. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 653 (2013) (discussing the validity of adhesion contracts and the role of public policy
in insurance contracts).
385. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
387. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-thinking Firestone in Light of Great-West-
Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in Welfare Benefit Claims,
37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 629, 661 n.147 (2004) ("The presumed self-interest of
contracting parties is the reason why courts apply de novo review under contract law,
deferring to neither party's interpretation of contract terms.").
388. See, e.g., Windstream Corp. v. Da Gragnano, No. 13-1723, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS
12810, at *8 (8th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014) (referring to a variety of plan-related documents
containing "reservation of rights clauses securing the company's right to modify the retiree
health benefits plan").
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an employer to make virtually any changes to a plan that are not
expressly prohibited by the statute's minimum standards. If the
employer neglects to reserve its rights in the initial plan document, it
may subsequently amend the plan to do so under the Supreme
Court's Curtiss-Wright decision. Thus, courts have permitted an
employer to amend a plan that had provided for employees to receive
any surplus assets on plan termination to provide that the surplus
assets would go to the employer," to amend a retiree health care
plan that provided lifetime health benefits to a plan that did not,3" or
to amend a health care plan to cap at a low-dollar-level AIDS
benefits, which resulted in a loss of benefits to an employee who,
while covered by the plan, contracted AIDS.39 ' In contracts of
adhesion outside the judicial arena for employee benefits, courts
typically would have used an interpretative framework far less
tolerant of the reserved rights of the contract's drafter to upset the
contract's original provisions or ignore the probable understanding of
the contract's terms to the nondrafting party.
Indeed, an employer's broad "settlor" privileges arguably
prevent the employer and employee from contractually agreeing to
any benefits that are not expressly identified and protected by a
specific provision in the statute, because the employer would always
retain the right to amend the plan. This would be a peculiar result in a
statute that requires a written contract and elaborate disclosure to
ensure the satisfaction of a plan's contractual obligations to its
participants.
Clauses that give the plan administrator, who is generally an
alter-ego of the employer, authority to interpret plan language, are
also treated differently from the way similar clauses in contracts of
adhesion are typically handled by state courts: some courts will simply
ignore such language and others will limit its reach to interpretations
that do not favor the contract's drafter." Increasingly, states are
389. See, e.g., In re C. D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd without opinion, 582 F.2d 1273, 1273 (3d Cir. 1978) (unpublished table
decision).
390. See generally Janilyn S. Brouwer, Retiree Health Benefits: The Promise of a
Lifetime?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 985 (1990) (discussing the legal theories on which various cases
have been litigated).
391. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,403 (5th Cir. 1991).
392. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law As Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315,
1323-24 (2007); Dahlia Schwartz, Breathing Lessons for the ERISA Vacuum: Toward a
Reconciliation of ERISA's Competing Objectives in the Health Benefits Arena, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 631, 658 (1999).
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incorporating bans on discretionary clauses in state insurance law. 93
As noted above,394 this approach has limited effect because most
employees with ERISA-governed health care plans are in self-insured
plans that are exempt from state law.
Courts3 95 and commentators"' may justify broad "settlor" powers
to override employee expectations because of Congress's concern
about employers' willingness to offer employee benefit plans' if the
law narrowed those powers. But this is a variation of an argument
that can be made against almost any type of consumer protection,
whether legislatively or judicially crafted: such protections will
increase costs or decrease choices to the consumer. The overarching
theme of ERISA was to protect reasonable employee benefit
expectations,9 and Congress implicitly recognized that this would at
the margins increase employer cost and willingness to sponsor
plans."' Allowing the employer, the drafter of the contract,
unchecked and unreviewable power of contract modification and
broad discretion to interpret contested contractual terms or facts
relating to eligibility, seems to us inconsistent with the statutory
framework that Congress adopted in ERISA.o
393. Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D. L.
REV. 500, 504-06 (2011).
394. See supra note 75.
395. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivatives & ERISA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 676
(S.D. Tex. 2003) ("The settlor function protection was created to encourage employers to
establish plans.").
396. See, e.g., Kathryn J. Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural Rules
of Pursuing an ERISA Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REV. 329, 331-32 (2001) ("As these
employee benefit plans are voluntary in nature, the courts have been cognizant of the plan
sponsor's settlor rights in the drafting, amending, and termination of such plans."); Medill,
supra note 304, at 919-20 ("The policy purpose behind the settlor function doctrine is to
encourage employers voluntarily to sponsor benefit plans by preserving the autonomy of
the employer to make decisions concerning the benefits offered to employees based upon
the nature of the employer's business, budget, and workforce.").
397. See, e.g., LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 259 (2008) (Roberts,
C.J. and Kennedy, J., concurring) (referencing statutory provisions to "encourage
employers and others to undertake the voluntary step of providing medical and retirement
benefits to plan participants").
398. See, e.g., ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012) ("It is hereby declared to be
the policy of this chapter to protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans.. .. ").
399. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
400. This is not to say that the employer should be locked into a nonamendable
framework; employers require flexibility to change plan terms and benefits. Thus, we are
not critical of an employer's ability to change plan terms, only that the power to amend is
unchecked by fiduciary restraints in all situations.
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2. Settlor Override of Statutory Provisions.
ERISA sets minimum standards for pension plans (and federal
law sets some standards for health care plans)," imposes strict duties
on those who are fiduciaries under the statute,40 provides an
enforcement scheme that is intended to provide "ready access to the
Federal courts,"" 3 and prohibits any person from interfering with the
attainment of benefits under a plan.' Yet in numerous cases the
courts have allowed plan sponsors to use the settlor/fiduciary doctrine
to dilute or negate statutory requirements.4 05 In our view, this is
problematic: there would have been little reason for Congress to
create requirements if the plan sponsor could choose to ignore them
in certain situations.
We offer a partial catalog of some of the ways in which the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine has trumped statutory requirements:
(i) Use of plan assets for the benefit of the plan sponsor.
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule and its prohibited transaction
rules bar the employer from using plan assets for its own account.4
Thus, a plan sponsor could not, for example, use plan assets to settle a
Title VII or torts claim brought by an employee. Moreover, it seems
plain that a fiduciary could not condition payment of promised
benefits on an employee releasing the plan sponsor from such claims.
Yet in the second leg of the Supreme Court trilogy, Lockheed
Corporation had conditioned an early retirement benefit on an
employee's waiver of all employment-based claims against the
employer." The employee argued that this violated both ERISA's
prohibited-transaction rules and its duty-of-care rule.48 The Court,
held, however, that the provision was one of plan design and thus not
subject to the restraints on fiduciary behavior.'
In principle, there does not seem to be a limit on the types of
claims that the employee could be required to sign away. There also,
in principle, does not seem to be any reason that the employer could
401. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
403. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
404. See supra Part II.C.4.
405. See supra Part II.C (describing the application of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine).
406. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
407. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 888 (1996).
408. Id. at 886.
409. Id. at 890-91.
[Vol. 93522
ERISA & FIDUCIARY DUTIES
not require the employee to waive future claims or, for that matter, to
tattoo the corporate logo onto the employee's forehead. Thus, the
employer is able, in effect, to use plan assets for, in the words of the
statute, its own account.
In Lockheed, the Court's decision was sensitive to this point, to a
point. The Court noted that the plaintiff had conceded that an
employer could receive legitimate benefits from adopting a plan,
including "attracting and retaining employees, paying deferred
compensation, settling or avoiding strikes, providing increased
compensation without increasing wages," 10 and inducing employees
to decide to retire. The Court then wrote that "[w]e do not see how
obtaining waivers of employment-related claims can meaningfully be
distinguished from these [other] admittedly permissible objectives."'"
But there is, of course, a difference: the other objectives come about
by sponsoring an employee benefit plan and the benefits the
employer receives are incidental to the sponsorship of a benefits plan.
Requiring the employee to waive claims against the employer is not
merely incidental to the sponsorship of a plan. And we note that in
Spink, the benefits were offered to a class of individuals.412 There is,
however, no overriding limiting principle in ERISA that would
prevent an employer from negotiating special benefits to induce a
particular employee to settle a lawsuit or barter away other rights.413
(ii) Selection of investment options in a self-directed
defined contribution plan.
When a fiduciary selects investment options for the menu of a
defined contribution plan, the choices are subject to ERISA's
fiduciary standards.414 If the plan specifies the investments, however,
the investment menu would be a settlor decision under Supreme
Court precedent, although the DOL has signaled that it believes the
development of an investment menu is a fiduciary function, even if
410. Id. at 893.
411. Id. at 894.
412. Id. at 885.
413. There may be other constraints: for example, the nondiscrimination rules of the
Internal Revenue Code would presumably make problematic a special benefit for a highly
compensated employee if some nonhighly compensated employees did not also obtain the
benefit. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 319, at 41-42. And, Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 might in some situations make it unlawful to direct benefit improvements to a
particular class of individuals. Id.
414. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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effected through a plan amendment.415 In any event, as we will explain
in the concluding section, the fiduciary would still be under an
obligation to monitor the investment options and presumably to stop
offering them if they were imprudent.
But as we have noted, the Seventh Circuit effectively held that a
decision to offer a large array of funds was a settlor decision and that
such a choice was inherently prudent.416 The irony here is that the
Seventh Circuit decision will provide incentives to plan designers, at
least in the Seventh Circuit, to choose a wide variety of funds to
insulate plan officials from fiduciary liability, even though many
commentators argue that a wide array of funds is not in the best
interests of employees who do not have substantial experience in
managing investments.417
A similar dynamic comes into play when a plan selects a
brokerage window. Arguably, a fiduciary that makes a decision to
provide a brokerage window has an obligation to consider its value
and cost to the plan population before selecting a window. 418 But if
the window is written into the terms of the plan, the decision to
include it would be a settlor decision, even if the fiduciary believed it
would be an attractive nuisance to many or even most employees.
415. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
417. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Employers As Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 760
(2014) ("[M]any employers appear to unnecessarily expose participants to investment risk
through too much choice...."); Keith R. Pyle, Compliance Under ERISA Section 404(c)
with Increasing Investment Alternatives and Account Accessibility, 32 IND. L. REV. 1467,
1487 (1999) ("Fewer funds would make participant investment choices easier and the
disclosure requirements more practical."); Sheena S. Iyengar, Wei Jiang & Gur
Huberman, How Much Choice Is Too Much?: Determinants of Individual Contributions In
401(k) Retirement Plans 9 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2003-10, 2003),
available at http://www.archetype-advisors.com/Images/Archetype/Participation/how
%20much%20is%20too%20much.pdf (finding that plans with fewer fund choices have
higher participation rates); see also Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail
Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 605, 623 (2014) ("[Plolicies that favor choice may be misguided, given the evidence
of the effect that too many choices have on decisionmaking quality."); Colleen E. Medill,
Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 323, 334
(2007) ("Choice overload-when individuals face an excessive number of choices-is one
problem associated with high information costs.").
418. See DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. No. 2012-02R, FEE
DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE 23 (2012) ("[F]iduciaries of... plans with platforms or
brokerage windows, self-directed brokerage accounts, or similar plan arrangements that
enable participants and beneficiaries to select investments beyond those designated by the
plan are still bound by ERISA section 404(a)'s statutory duties of prudence and loyalty to
participants and beneficiaries . . . .").
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(iii) Discrimination by plan amendment.
Section 510 of ERISA makes it unlawful for any person to
interfere "with the attainment of any right to which [a] participant
may become entitled under the plan"419 or under ERISA. Thus, an
employer would violate section 510 if it fired an employee with an
expensive medical condition to prevent the employee from obtaining
benefits from an employer health plan.420 But the employer's
amendment of the plan to eliminate payment for the particular
medical condition afflicting the employee, or to amend the plan to
eliminate coverage of the employee, is arguably a settlor decision and
not actionable under ERISA.42 1
(iv) Impeding access to the federal courts.
ERISA was intended to provide participants with ready access to
the federal courts.422 The statute imposes no amount-in-controversy
thresholds and provides nationwide service of process and generous
venue provisions.423 While ERISA does not provide a statute of
limitations for benefit claims, courts have incorporated state-law
limitations periods, although claims accrual is determined under
federal law.424
Some plan sponsors have used their settlor role to constrict
access to the federal courts by drafting plans to reduce the time in
which participants can bring a civil action challenging a benefit
denial.425 Plans, particularly in the disability and health benefit areas,
may include a plan-specific limitations period, which can be
substantially shorter than applicable state limitations periods, which
also can trigger the running of the limitations clock earlier than would
be the case under federal claims accrual case law, and which can
419. ERISA § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140(2012).
420. See, e.g., Muir, supra note 28, at 241-42.
421. There is an oddity to this result because here a pure business decision to, for
example, terminate the employee to prevent attainment of a benefit would violate ERISA
section 510, but an amendment of a plan would not.
422. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of
this chapter to ... provid[e] ... ready access to the federal courts.").
423. ERISA § 502(d), (e)(2), (f), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d), (e)(2), (f).
424. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW,supra note 19, at 12-21 to -24.
425. See, e.g., Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 609
(2013).
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result in claims accrual before the plan has formally and finally denied
the claim.426 The Supreme Court recently upheld such a limitation.427
The use of the settlor function to set accelerated limitations
periods undercuts the congressional goal of providing ready access to
the federal courts. We note here that the Supreme Court has
indicated that any plan-defined limitations period must be
reasonable.4 28 It appears, however, that substantially accelerated
limitations periods meet that requirement.429
(v) Allowing a fiduciary to interpret legal requirements.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,430 the Supreme Court
indicated that a plan could include a provision giving a fiduciary
discretion to interpret plan terms, which limits the scope of
subsequent judicial review to an arbitrary and capricious standard.4 3 1
In some cases, courts have held that this deferential standard of
review can apply to a fiduciary's interpretation of plan provisions
incorporating legal requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.432
For example, consider a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision. 433 The plan, as required by the Internal Revenue Code,
included language providing for vesting on a partial termination of
the plan.43 The plan administrator determined that there had been no
plan termination when substantial percentages of the plan's
participants left service in each of two successive years.435 A class of
participants brought a civil action, contesting the administrator's
426. See id. at 608.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 610.
429. Id. at 612 (noting that the claimant had about one year of the three-year limitation
period after administrative resolution).
430. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
431. Id. at 1ll.
432. See infra notes 433-37.
433. Admin. Comm. of the Sea Ray Emps.' Stock Ownership & Profit Sharing Plan v.
Robinson, 164 F.3d 981, 983 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Monks v. Keystone Powdered Metal
Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d. 647, 655 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard
rather than de novo standard of review), affd, 10 F. App'x 273 (6th Cir. 2001); McDaniel
v. Chevron, No. C-96-2891-CAL, 1998 WL 355534, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("[T]he proper
standard of review is for abuse of discretion."), aff'd, 203 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 2000). In
many other circumstances, courts do not give deference to a plan administrator's
interpretation of legal requirements. See, e.g., Penn v. Howe-Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 898 F.2d
1096, 1100 (1990).
434. Robinson, 164 F.3d at 984.
435. See id. at 983.
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decision that there had not been a partial termination.436 Rather than
decide whether there had been a partial termination under the
applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the panel limited
its review to whether the plan administrator's determination had been
arbitrary and capricious and determined that it was not.437 It is
certainly questionable whether a plan provision should be able to
substitute a plan administrator's legal interpretation of a statutory
requirement for a court's interpretation.
(vi) Bypassing ERISA's writing requirement.
ERISA straightforwardly requires employee benefit plans to be
written.438 Courts and commentators have explained this requirement
as necessary so that participants will understand the terms of the plan,
their rights, and their responsibilities.439 In addition, Treasury
regulations predating ERISA require that DB pension plans provide
definitely determinable benefits at retirement-that is, benefits that
can be determined under a plan formula." Pension plans would fail
the definitely determinable requirement,"' and other types of plans
arguably would fail the writing requirement if they provided that
benefit eligibility were entirely contingent on the discretion of the
employer to grant or determine the size of the benefit.442 But courts
436. See id.
437. Id. at 989.
438. ERISA §402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
439. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995) ("In the
words of the key congressional report, '[a] written plan is to be required in order that
every employee may, on examining the plan documents, determine exactly what his rights
and obligations are under the plan.' " (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting H. R. Rep.
No. 93-1280, at 297 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5077));
James E. Holloway, The ERISA Amendment Provision As a Disclosure Function:
Including Workable Termination Procedures in the Functional Purpose of Section
402(b)(3), 46 DRAKE L. REv. 755, 762 (1998) ("ERISA consists of an elaborate
informational scheme that is created by disclosure and reporting requirements to apprise
plan participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under benefit plans.");
Medill, supra note 304, at 894-95 ("The purpose of the written plan document rule is to
provide assurance to participants that they may examine the plan document and know
with certainty their rights under the plan and who is responsible for operating the plan.");
Frank P. VanderPloeg, Role-Playing Under ERISA: The Company As "Employer" and
"Fiduciary", 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 259, 286 (1997).
440. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2014).
441. See id.
442. See Bogan, supra note 387, at 684 n.246 (discussing the Solicitor General's view
that "benefit denials based upon language giving the administrator unbounded
discretionary authority may be unreasonable and in bad faith"). But see Hamilton v. Air
Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 75-76 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing the district court's holding that
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have approved clauses in plans that give the employer the ability to
designate who is entitled to a benefit. In the T&B case, for example,
the plan provided that severance benefits would be paid only if "the
terminating manager believes the granting of such pay is
appropriate."43 The eligibility terms for the benefit, then, were
committed to the determination that they were "appropriate" in the
subjective judgment of the terminating manager." The eligibility
terms thus did not, in substance, appear in the plan. And as we noted
earlier, the court held that the manager's decision as to whether it was
"appropriate" to pay benefits was made in a business rather than
fiduciary capacity."
(vii) The decision to invest in employer stock.
A retirement plan invested in employer stock is rife with
problems: it can leave employees with a risky, undiversified portfolio
and it creates myriad conflicts of interest. Thus, ERISA limits a DB
plan's investment in employer stock to ten percent of its assets." 6
However, a plan sponsor may design a plan to invest primarily in
employer stock or sponsor a 401(k) plan. Some of the diversification
rules are waived in each of those types of plans."7
Thus, a settlor decision to design a plan primarily to invest in
employer stock is, in essence, a decision to opt out of much of
ERISA's fiduciary rules. But unlike other problems identified in this
section, Congress expressly authorized the plan sponsor to design a
plan to be an ESOP and thus subject to a weaker fiduciary regime.'
3. Settlor Decisions Exploiting Regulatory Vacuums
ERISA includes a field-occupying preemption provision
preempting, with only limited exceptions, any state law that relates to
an employee benefit plan."' Thus, ERISA ousts states from
the plan violates the writing requirement if it makes the benefit contingent on the
employer's discretion).
443. Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 188 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1999).
444. Id. at 159.
445. Id. at 162.
446. ERISA § 407(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012).
447. Sean M. Anderson, Risky Retirement Business: How ESOPs Harm the Workers
They Are Supposed to Help, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2009) (comparing the
diversification rights of 401(k) plan and ESOP participants).
448. ERISA § 407(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b).
449. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144; see Andrew Stumpff, Darkness at Noon: Judicial
Interpretation May Have Made Things Worse for Benefit Plan Participants Under ERISA
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regulating even those aspects of employee benefit plans that ERISA
itself does not regulate. 450
ERISA, from its 1974 origins, imposed various consumer-
protection standards on the design of retirement plans, primarily in
the areas of vesting and benefit accrual.451 And the statute did of
course create fiduciary rules that applied to all benefit plans.452 But
ERISA did not initially impose consumer protections on welfare
benefit plans,453 although some protections were later added to
federal law, most recently by the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act.454 But there remain large swathes of benefit topics that are
not regulated by ERISA and cannot, because of ERISA's sweeping
preemptive reach, be regulated by the states.
This creates fertile ground for various problematic plan design
features to take root, features that may violate state-federal
consensus on legal behavior outside the arena of employee benefit
plans. As discussed above, the Supreme Court recently had an
opportunity to explore this issue in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen, in
which a plan participant challenged the validity and reach of a health
care plan's subrogation provision.455 The provision required the
participant to reimburse the plan for medical expenses from any tort
recovery.456
Notwithstanding the fact that some states would not have
enforced any subrogation clause under a medical insurance policy 457
and states consistently have refused to enforce a subrogation clause
than Had the Statute Never Been Enacted, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 221, 229 (2011) ("From
the standpoint of a plan participant, ERISA's preemption clause has for practical purposes
indeed cleared the employee benefits field of state law.").
450. There is an exception to ERISA preemption for state insurance laws, but the
exception does not apply to plans that self-insure and applies only to laws that relate to
insured plans, which do not, for example, include separate state regulation of claims
procedures. See supra note 75 (discussing application of the insurance law exception).
451. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
452. See supra Part 1.B.
453. See supra text accompanying note 70.
454. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6604, 124 Stat. 119, 780 (2010) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 6604 (2012)). Shortly after passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Congress enacted numerous amendments in the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001, 124 Stat. 1029, 1030
(2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012)).
455. 133 S. Ct. 1542, 1542-43 (2013). For more detailed discussion of the case, see supra
text accompanying notes 305-16.
456. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct at 1543.
457. See Brief for Respondents at 52, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537
(2013) (No. 11-1285) (explaining that categorical bans of reimbursement have not caused
insurers to refuse to issue coverage in states with those bans).
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against a recovery without prior deduction for attorney's fees;458 and
notwithstanding that the subrogation rights claimed by the U.S.
Airways plan exceeded the subrogation rights of the federal
government for its payment of medical expenses under Medicare,
Medicaid, and the Federal Employee's Health Benefits Act,459 the
Supreme Court ruled that nothing in ERISA prohibited or in any way
limited a plan's subrogation clause, which the Court equated to a
contractual provision.o The majority, however, found that the
subrogation clause in question was not sufficiently clear on whether
attorney's fees should first be deducted and was unwilling to interpret
the clause in such an unnatural way in the absence of clearer
language.46
Thus, the Supreme Court has provided that an ERISA plan can
include and enforce a subrogation clause that neither the federal
government nor any state would enforce as written. It is difficult to
articulate a persuasive argument why employer-sponsored health care
plans should be the only species of health care plan unaffected by a
federal and state consensus that subrogation clauses in health care
plans should be limited.
Settlor choices on plan design can also shield, or at least partly
shield, medical professionals from state malpractice claims. In the
case of Pegram v. Herdrich,42 the Supreme Court ruled that a doctor
for a health maintenance organization was not acting as a fiduciary
when she made a mixed treatment/eligibility decision and thus a
participant denied needed medical care had no action against the
HMO.43 But the decision was widely understood to mean that the
participant could bring a state-law civil action for malpractice against
the doctor and in some states perhaps against the HMO itself." Plan
sponsors, however, were able to find a plan design solution that
protected both the physician and the HMO from liability by vesting
the eligibility question to a plan official other than the treating
physician; the plan official's decision would be a plan benefit
determination, subject to deferential review, and malpractice actions
458. See id. at 26-27.
459. See id. at 53.
460. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1548.
461. Id.
462. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
463. Id. at 237. For additional discussion of Pegram, see supra text accompanying notes
288-96.
464. See Thomas Jost, Pegram v. Herdich: The Supreme Court Confronts Managed
Care, I YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 187, 187 (2001).
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against the plan would be barred." The treating physician would be
protected from medical malpractice since the decision to withhold or
choose a less expensive method of treatment was made by the plan
official rather than the treating physician. Thus, through the settlor
function, HMOs are able to insulate themselves and their physicians
from certain types of malpractice claims.466
In principle, we see no reason why HMOs, insurance companies,
and self-insured plans could not further insulate physicians from
malpractice claims by including clauses in the plan that participants
agree not to bring a malpractice action against a physician for
ordinary negligence, or not to seek punitive damages, or to forego
judicial resolution of malpractice claims in favor of binding
arbitration. Such plan provisions would pose challenging preemption
questions if a state found them against public policy, for such
provisions would certainly reduce plan costs and state failures to
respect them thus would seemingly be related to an employee benefit
plan. While we are not aware of such clauses today, we would be
mildly surprised not to see them in the future.
B. The Statutory Basis for the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine
In this subsection we consider a question of textual analysis:
whether ERISA's language and structure compel the expansive scope
that the Supreme Court gave to the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. This
question has implications beyond its inherent academic interest,
because the answer bears at least somewhat on the ability of the
courts to rein in the doctrine without legislative modification of the
statutory language.
As we earlier observed, the first reference to the settlor/fiduciary
distinction occurred in a 1986 DOL letter to a prominent private
attorney concerning whether a decision to terminate an overfunded
DB plan (which enabled the employer to recover plan's assets in
excess of plan liabilities) was subject to ERISA's fiduciary regime.6
If it were, the employer's decision to terminate the plan-at least a
465. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that ERISA
preempts malpractice claims against HMOs when a nontreating physician makes a benefit
eligibility decision).
466. The Davila Court's holding distinguished Pegram, noting that the treating
physician's mixed eligibility/treatment decision was not a fiduciary decision and could be
subject to a state malpractice action. 542 U.S. at 218. We note that it is possible to read
Davila to allow a physician to make an eligibility determination as a plan fiduciary rather
than as a physician (such as whether a treatment is experimental), but this is not clear.
467. Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114.
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termination with an asset reversion to the employer-almost certainly
would have violated the statute, since it would be difficult to argue
that the decision to recover surplus assets was made in the exclusive
interest of the plan's participants. The Department held that it was
not, "in light of the voluntary nature of the private pension system
governed by ERISA."4" The Department wrote that it had
"concluded that there is a class of discretionary activities which relate
to the formation, rather than the management, of plans. These so-
called 'settlor' functions include decisions relating to the
establishment, termination and design of plans and are not fiduciary
activities subject to Title I of ERISA." 9 The Department, then, did
not base its rationale solely, and seemingly not even primarily, on the
statutory language defining fiduciary, but rather based the decision on
the foundational structure of employer benefits regulation under the
statute: the decision to adopt, amend, or terminate a plan is a
voluntary employer decision and must be so in a system where plan
sponsorship is voluntary.470
The letter, perhaps significantly, also left room to pull back at
least somewhat from the idea that every decision made in a settlor
capacity is exempt from ERISA's fiduciary regime. The DOL letter
stated that the "decision to terminate is generally not subject to the
fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA," which suggests that
that the Department was reserving flexibility to subject some plan
termination decisions (and other settlor decisions) to the statute's
fiduciary regulation if policy or other prudential concerns arose in the
future that warranted it.471
In contrast to the DOL, the Supreme Court has "rooted" its
version of the distinction "in the text of ERISA's definition of
fiduciary," 472 which provides that
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority
or control respecting management or disposition of its
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. The statute expressly provides for reversions and gives employers the authority to
terminate a sufficiently funded plan. ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
471. Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114 (emphasis added). Of course, it is
possible that this potential limitation on the Department's view of the doctrine's contours
results from less than fully attentive drafting, but the letter on the whole appears to have
been carefully composed.
472. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996).
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assets ... or (iii) he has any discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.473
In its Spink decision, the Court held that the act of amending a plan is
not a discretionary administrative or managerial act and thus that
ERISA fiduciary standards do not apply to plan amendments.47 4
The statutory language, however, did not mandate this result and
could have been interpreted in less absolutist terms. We do not
attempt here to develop the "correct" interpretation of the statutory
definition of fiduciary, because the words of the definition, and how
the definition is situated within the structure of the statute, do not
lead inexorably to a single correct interpretation. The correct
interpretation, in such circumstances, is of course the interpretation
that the Supreme Court crafts. In this section, we suggest only that
the Supreme Court's categorical determination that a person who
designs a plan can never be a fiduciary was not inevitable and that the
statute was susceptible to interpretations that would have permitted
some judicial flexibility to treat plan amendments as fiduciary actions.
These interpretations include the following:
(1) Management and Administrative Decisions Through
Plan Design.
In its Spink decision, the Supreme Court held that "amending or
terminating a plan ... cannot be an act of plan 'management' or
'administration.' "'4' The Court observed that the plan was like a trust
and a fiduciary akin to a trustee, who was to administer the plan in
accordance with the plan documents, just as a trustee was to
administer a trust in accordance with trust documents.476 But the
statute does not require that reading. The statutory definition of
fiduciary provides four circumstances in which a person is a
fiduciary-one of which is exercising discretionary control or
authority respecting the management of the plan, and a second is
having discretionary control or authority in the administration of the
plan.477 The statute, then, recognizes a difference between plan
management and plan administration, but the Court's opinion does
473. ERISA § 3(21)(A),29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
474. Spink, 517 U.S. at 890-91.
475. Id. at 890 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,505 (1996)).
476. See id.
477. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for the language of ERISA § 3(21)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
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not explore the statutory distinction or whether an amendment can
ever be an act of plan management even if not an act of plan
administration.
(2) Management or Disposition of Plan Assets.
The definition of fiduciary also provides that a person is a
fiduciary to the extent that he exercises any authority or control over
the management or disposition of plan assets.47 8 In a funded plan, an
amendment or plan design feature will often affect the disposition or
investment of plan assets. 479 And in an unfunded plan, certain plan
amendments-such as the selection of a named plan fiduciary or the
selection of a closed panel HMO-will affect the disposition of plan
assets and seem literally to be covered by the ERISA definition of
fiduciary.
(3) Investment Direction Through Plan Amendment.
A person who provides investment advice to a plan is a fiduciary
under the statute's definition.' But under the Supreme Court's
doctrine,481 if the investment advice is given to the plan settlor to help
the settlor design the plan and the advice is incorporated into the plan
design, the person who gave investment advice presumably would not
be a fiduciary, for the investment advice would not be given to the
plan but rather to the plan settlor. There is little reason, though, to
differentiate between investment advice given to a plan designer,
which would then become part of the plan document, and investment
advice given to a fiduciary, which would implement the plan's
478. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for the language of ERISA § 3(21)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
479. The Court focused on the difference between welfare and retirement plans,
although its intent seemed to be to distinguish between funded and nonfunded plans. See
Spink, 517 U.S. at 890-91.
480. Longstanding DOL regulations narrowly define when an investment adviser acts
as an ERISA fiduciary. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2013). The Department has
appropriately recommended a more inclusive definition, given changes in the nature of
retirement plans. Definition of the Term "Fiduciary," 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,263-64
(proposed Oct. 22, 2010). The DOL subsequently withdrew the proposed regulation and
indicated it will redraft and repropose it. Department of Labor News Release 11-1382-
NAT (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsalnewsroom/2011/11-1382-
NAT.html.
481. See supra text accompanying note 414-15 (discussing the Supreme Court's
distinction between plan design and fiduciary behavior).
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investment function. If functionally the advice to shape an investment
menu is the same whether given to the designer of a plan document or
to the plan fiduciary, they should presumably be treated the same
under ERISA's fiduciary regulation. And if investment advice to the
plan designer should make the advisor a fiduciary, then the plan
designer who receives the advice and adopts a particular investment
structure should presumably also be a fiduciary, in the same way that
a plan official implementing investment advice would be a fiduciary.
We reiterate that we are not contending that the Supreme
Court's take on the scope of fiduciary activity is implausible or that a
more expansive interpretation of fiduciary activity is more closely
aligned with the statutory language. We are contending only that a
more expansive interpretation was also plausible.482 Nor are we
suggesting that a more expansive interpretation would have been
easier for courts to apply. Indeed, as we noted at the start of this
Article, one of the virtues of the Supreme Court trilogy is that it is an
easy doctrine for courts to apply. It has the simplicity and
predictability of a simple chemical reaction.
A more expansive doctrine would have produced more hard
cases, cases whose resolution would have required nuanced doctrine
and judicial judgment. In their 1988 article, Professors Fischel and
Langbein nominated the trust principle of impartiality as a "likely
doctrinal rubric"483 for resolving questions involving competition
among classes of participants, or among participants and plan
sponsors, for finite trust resources. In the authors' view, courts also
could have developed a doctrine that applies fiduciary analysis to plan
design decisions that are functionally equivalent to management or
administrative activities (for example, the selection of a menu of
investments or the appointment of a named fiduciary seem clear
examples of plan management decisions, whether made in designing a
plan or in implementing a plan provision giving a fiduciary the
responsibility to make those decisions). And courts could have
focused on the statute itself, cordoning off from fiduciary analysis
aspects of plan design that the statute expressly places in the ambit of
employer discretion-for example, establishing a plan designed to
invest in employer stock or a pension plan that provides that an
employer can recover surplus plan assets on termination of the plan.
482. Some lower courts-including in Hughes and Spink-did have a more expansive
view of fiduciary action. See supra text accompanying notes 129,143-44.
483. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1107.
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Decisions in individual cases would have been tougher under a
less rigid settlor/fiduciary distinction, but the decision making would
have focused on statutorily relevant substance rather than on a purely
formalistic inquiry. And the concerns we have about future
developments in plan design and employee benefits law would have
been more modest if the Supreme Court had constructed a less rigid
divide between settlor and fiduciary functions.
IV. PRUNING BACK THE DOCTRINE
The settlor/fiduciary doctrine operates mechanically and largely
lacks nuance. It has no obvious brake or governor on its excesses and
accommodates, if not invites, sharp practices. It privileges formalism
over substance, prevents certain types of contractual understandings,
upsets Congressional policy judgments, effectuates conflicts of
interest, ignores an important part of the economics of employee
benefits, and undermines national consensus on some legal issues. To
us, the problems with the doctrine have become more apparent with
time, and we have little confidence that the doctrine will not result in
the growth of new problematic issues unless it is trimmed back, either
through judicially developed limitations on the doctrine's scope
(perhaps with a hand from the DOL) or through legislative
modification of the statute itself.
The prospects for either approach may not be promising. Given
that there are no interest groups currently lobbying for legislative
redesign of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine and that if such a group
improbably appeared it would almost certainly be met by a resolute
and well-heeled pension industry that has a strongly focused interest
in retaining the doctrine in its broadest form, amendment of the
statute to reshape the settlor/fiduciary doctrine seems unlikely,
particularly in an era marked by legislative gridlock. If legislative
change comes, it is likely to come in the shape of targeted provisions
to address specific issues, as occurred, for example, in the late 1980s,
when Congress created limitations on the ability of employers to
access surplus assets on the termination of a DB plan' or in 2006
when Congress added some legislative protections for participants
during a conversion of a traditional DB plan to a cash balance plan. 8
It would not surprise us, then, to see, for example, some additional
484. See, e.g., Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 2005(c)(1), 102 Stat. 3342, 3611-12.
485. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 701, 120 Stat. 780, 982,
985, 992.
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protections for participants affected by de-risking transactions,
possibly in the form of additional disclosures. 486
Judicial revision of the doctrine may seem even more improbable
than legislative modification, given the Supreme Court's multiple
pronouncements on the doctrine, which situate a mechanical and
expansive version of the doctrine squarely in the statutory definition
of fiduciary. Initially, then, there does not appear much room for
doctrinal give, but we do have some reason for optimism. First, the
doctrine could be limited collaterally, outside the language and
structure of the ERISA fiduciary definition, by focusing on the
statutory prohibition on enforcing a plan term that is inconsistent
with the provisions of the statute, implementation of plan
amendments and plan terminations, limits to ERISA's preemptive
reach, and development of a common law of ERISA. Second, some of
the doctrine's rigidity might be attributed to dicta in the Spink
decision that did not distinguish between plan administration and
plan management.487 Giving content to the plan management
component of ERISA's fiduciary definition would provide room for
some adjustment at the margins. Third, the Supreme Court has
developed rigid doctrine on ERISA preemption and remedies only to
retreat when the statute began producing outcomes divorced from the
policies and concerns that seemingly undergird the statute and,
arguably, from common sense. The Court has at least in one case
signaled its willingness to follow a similar path with the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine.488
As we discuss, in turn, each of these potential judicial approaches
to achieving a more nuanced interpretation of the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine, we link the approaches back to the three categories of
concern we identified above in Part 111.489 Those categories are: (1)
concerns related to employee expectations; (2) concerns related to
undermining ERISA protections; and (3) concerns related to the
creation of regulatory voids, particularly in welfare plans.
486. See supra text accompanying notes 239-43 (discussing de-risking transactions).
487. See supra text accompanying notes 129-37.
488. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (explaining that, although
plaintiffs were limited in their menu of potential remedies under ERISA, granting
plaintiffs a remedy was nonetheless "consistent with the literal language of [ERISA], the
Act's purposes, and pre-existing trust law"). For a discussion of Varity, see supra text
accompanying notes 186-202.
489. See supra Part Il.A.
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A. Collateral Modification of the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine
We begin with the possibility of judicial modification of the
doctrine itself, albeit through a collateral approach that would leave
intact the Court's grounding of the doctrine in ERISA's statutory
definition of fiduciary. Available in a variety of situations, the
common thread of the collateral approach is that it would involve
application of substantive ERISA provisions to set boundaries on the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine. Its grounding in ERISA's requirements
means the approach could prevent the doctrine from being used to
undermine ERISA's substantive protections. Because of the range of
ERISA's substantive protections, the collateral approach may be the
most useful of the three opportunities the courts have to reshape the
boundaries of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.
1. Prohibition on Enforcing a Plan Term Inconsistent with Statutory
Provisions
It is the duty of a fiduciary to follow the terms of a plan
document "insofar" as the document is "consistent with [the
statute.]"4 " This language, "consistent with [the statute],"49 ' could be
restrictively read, as it generally seems to have been in
settlor/fiduciary cases to date, to prohibit a fiduciary from enforcing a
plan provision only if the term unequivocally violates another ERISA
rule-for example, a vesting or accrual rule." Under this approach, a
fiduciary may enforce a plan term if it arguably violates an ERISA
general standard, such as the general fiduciary prudence standard,493
or if it violates the "full and fair review" requirement regarding
participant claims, 494 or the written plan requirement.495 Taking such
an approach certainly has the virtue of allowing a fiduciary to follow
plan terms without having to make difficult judgment calls on
whether the plan conflicts with either ERISA's fiduciary or
nonfiduciary standards of behavior.
But this approach raises fundamental issues, for it permits a
fiduciary to take actions pursuant to a specific plan provision even
though the fiduciary's actions might be imprudent or otherwise in
violation of the statute if exercised pursuant to the fiduciary's
490. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012).
491. Id.
492. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 64 (referring to ERISA's vesting and
accrual rules).
493. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
494. See ERISA § 503(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
495. See ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
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discretion or a less-specific grant of authority. For example, we have
already noted the tension that exists 496 between the Department's
1991 position that a person acts in a fiduciary capacity when the
person selects investments, "whether achieved through fiduciary
designation or express plan language," 497 and the Supreme Court's
1999 Hughes opinion, which held that plan amendments are always
settlor actions and outside the ambit of fiduciary regulation.498 There
are at least two ways to bridge the tension, one using the collateral
limitation approach, which we discuss here, and a second that we will
discuss in the next subsection. The former approach would rely on the
duty of a fiduciary to discharge her duties "in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such
documents and instruments are consistent with [the statute.]" 499 If a
plan document specifies investment options that are imprudent or
that become imprudent over time, then a fiduciary implementing the
plan directions could not follow them without violating the fiduciary
duties of prudence and fealty to the exclusive interests of the
participant and beneficiaries of the plan. A problem remains,
however, in applying this concept to participant-directed 401(k) and
KSOP plans. Frequently, in those plans the only relevant fiduciary for
investment-related transactions is the entity that implements
participants' investment directions.soo Those trustees are known as
directed trustees, and they only have obligations to evaluate the
prudence of investment options if they have nonpublic information
about the options or in other very limited circumstances when the
investment option consists of employer stock."o' Thus, typically even if
a plan's investment menu becomes imprudent, the directed trustee
would not have any obligation, or even any ability, to take action to
remove the imprudent investment as a plan option. As a result, in
many plans relying on a fiduciary that implements plan directions to
identify and eliminate imprudent investments is not a viable option.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 114-35.
497. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans
(ERISA Section 404(c) Plans), 57 Fed. Reg. 46,922, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
498. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999); see also Lockheed v.
Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890-91 (1996) ("Lockheed acted not as a fiduciary but as a settlor
when it amended the terms of the Plan to include the retirement programs.").
499. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
500. See DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. No. 2004-03, FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTED TRUSTEES 4-6 (2004), available at http://www.dol.gov
/ebsa/regs/fab_2004-3.htmi.
501. Id.
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This understanding of ERISA's prudence requirement and the
potential lack of any fiduciary to serve in that role provides a basis for
courts to consider imposing a collateral limitation on the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine in light of the prudence provision. Even
conceding for purposes of argument that the initial selection
constitutes a settlor decision when the investment menu is included in
the plan terms, that only requires that the original choice of
investments be outside the scope of fiduciary obligation. It need not
undermine the ongoing fiduciary monitoring obligation inherent in
the concept of prudence. Instead, courts could treat the plan sponsor
as a fiduciary for the plan investment menu in all respects, including
monitoring, other than the initial decision to include the menu in the
plan terms.
We acknowledge that monitoring and determining the prudence
of plan investment options will require difficult judgments by
fiduciaries and courts. But, in the authors' view the courts are well
equipped to develop appropriate standards consistent with the statute
and trust law underpinnings of ERISA's fiduciary obligations. And, in
fact, these determinations will not be entirely new for either courts or
fiduciaries. For example, courts have struggled to fashion appropriate
standards to test when a fiduciary's purchase of employer stock
pursuant to plan terms is imprudent (or violates the exclusive benefit
rule).502 In developing standards for these cases, courts have worked
to reconcile the competing dictates of prudence with the express
statutory authorization of a plan designed to invest primarily in
employer stock.503 They have held that a fiduciary is subject to a less
probing ERISA prudence analysis when purchasing employer stock
pursuant to a plan provision directing the fiduciary to do so.50 An
alternative and more generally applicable approach may be to query
whether the action would be permissible for a fiduciary granted
maximum discretion under the plan. We note that such a test could be
implemented through a mirror image in the fiduciary/settlor doctrine
itself, in which a plan design feature would be a fiduciary act if it
502. See supra text accompanying notes 260-66.
503. Id.
504. See, e.g., Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 717 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir.), withdrawn and
superseded on denial of reh'g en banc, 738 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, judgment
vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (mem.); see also Taveras v. UBS AG, 107
F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that if a reference to employer stock in plan terms was
sufficient to give rise to the presumption of prudence, then the presumption would nearly
always apply).
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required a plan official to act in a way that would be impermissible if
the plan official had merely been given broad discretionary authority.
In some circumstances, particularly those related to employee
expectations, courts may look to the statute's exclusive purpose
obligation, which is often discussed in terms of the trust law concept
of loyalty, to limit the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. In their seminal
article, Professors Fischel and Langbein observed that loyalty in trust
law typically requires a trustee to use the principle of impartiality to
resolve opposing interests between trust beneficiaries.sos That
approach could have significant power in resolving a variety of
problems we observed earlier in this Article. For example, courts
typically have applied the settlor doctrine to permit a plan sponsor to
amend a health care plan, as happened in McGann,5" to eliminate a
benefit of importance to one or a few employees. Instead, a court
could collaterally constrain the doctrine in light of both section 510's
prohibition on accomplishing the same outcome by firing the affected
employees and the principle of neutrality embedded in section 5 10.517
Similarly, courts have permitted plan sponsors to convert DB plans to
cash balance plans and include plan terms that impose wearaways
with particularly harsh effects on the benefits of older and/or longer
service employees.51 Here again, the obligation of loyalty, and
through it impartiality, could require a more equitable distribution of
the economic effects of the plan change on participants.
So far we have been discussing ways in which ERISA's fiduciary
standards might be interpreted to limit the scope of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine; other ERISA provisions might also be
inconsistent with unquestioned adherence to terms of a plan. Cases
such as Heimeshoff" could be resolved by determining when a plan
505. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1121.
506. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1991)
(permitting employer to eliminate AIDS-related coverage from its benefits plan shortly
after plaintiff submitted AIDS-related claims, the Court noted "Congress did not intend
that ERISA circumscribe employers' control over the content of benefits plans they
offered to their employees").
507. ERISA § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012).
508. See, e.g., Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003) (permitting
conversion to cash balance plan causing employee to lose $3,000 in benefits per year
because the complaint was procedurally foreclosed); Tootle v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D.
88, 93 (D. Md. 2004) (permitting employer's conversion of benefits plan to cash balance
plan, resulting in declining benefit accrual rate as employee aged); see also Eaton v. Onan
Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (cash balance defined benefit pension plan
did not violate ERISA pension age discrimination provision on ground that rate of benefit
accrual declined with employee's age).
509. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013).
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provision violates the ERISA requirement that plans offer a full and
fair review process for benefit denials.5s0 Plan provisions requiring a
fiduciary to apply discretion (or to defer to the discretion of a
nonfiduciary, as in Noorily") in determining eligibility for a benefit
could be held to be in conflict with the requirement that a plan, and
presumably its terms, be in a written document. Decisions on DB plan
benefit structures and funding also could be reviewed in the context
of ERISA's requirements. For example, recall that the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided that adoption of a benefit structure that
was so generous it caused the plan to become severely underfunded
was a settlor action because the trustees amended the plan to specify
the level of benefits.1 If the court had considered the collateral
effects of either the fiduciary obligation of prudence or plan funding
rules, the court may have drawn the settlor definition more narrowly.
A slightly different approach from relying on ERISA's
substantive provisions to cabin the settlor/fiduciary doctrine would be
for courts to limit settlor functions to those that relate to benefits,
benefit eligibility, and internal plan administration, but not matters
that relate to judicial or executive branch oversight of plans. Under
this view of the doctrine, for example, a plan provision could not
reduce the time a participant would have to bring a civil action
against a plan for benefits. Including such a provision in the plan
document would not transform the decision into a fiduciary decision
but rather would result in an unenforceable plan term.
This principle would also mean that plan terms could neither be
used to limit participants' remedies under ERISA nor to expand
settlor remedies beyond those clearly enunciated in the statute.
Determination of remedies, after all, is a prerogative of the judiciary
and in some instances the administrative branch. Recall the recent
Supreme Court decision in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen,so where the
Court addressed the question of whether a plan could preclude
participants' reliance on traditional equitable defenses to limit
510. This may not be a problematic issue for the fiduciary, though, for presumably the
fiduciary's compliance with the plan terms, while perhaps challengeable in court, would
presumably not result in fiduciary financial responsibility for a breach.
511. Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 188 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that
an employer does not act as a fiduciary when designing, as opposed to administering, a
benefits plan and that the employer has discretion in creating a plan "that furthers its
business interests").
512. Gard v. Blankenburg, Nos. 00-1234, 00-2224, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2963, at *15
(6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2002). For a discussion of Gard, see supra notes 231-35 and
accompanying text.
513. 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013).
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remedies sought by the plan.' The essence of the Court's decision
was that, since ERISA does not prohibit plans from barring
application of those equitable defenses, clear plan provisions
excluding them would be enforceable. 15 However, the effect is to
permit plan sponsors to rewrite ERISA remedies in their favor-a
result surely not contemplated in the statute's enactment.
2. Distinguishing Implementation from Design
The courts have already expressly identified one collateral
limitation on settlor actions: the implementation of plan design
features.s'" The "implementation" idea, though, is not so much a
limitation on the settlor/fiduciary doctrine as it is a restatement of it:
discretionary actions implementing plan provisions are fiduciary
actions. The difficulty with this approach is twofold: first, in close
cases, how do we demarcate where the plan design decision ends and
implementation begins; and second, what does implementation
entail?
We have already discussed the former in the context of the
Supreme Court's Beck decision, in which the Court held that under
Title IV of ERISA the plan sponsor's decision to terminate a plan
was a plan design decision that required the purchase of annuities. 17
Ultimately, Beck teaches us that courts will need to make case-by-
case determinations between plan design decisions and
implementation decisions in close cases, although since Beck no close
case has emerged."'1
The latter-what does implementation entail-also will require
case-by-case determinations that intersect with the settlor/fiduciary
doctrine in cases where conflicts of interest are particularly
intractable. The application of ERISA's fiduciary standards in these
contexts is beyond the scope of this Article; however, it is useful
briefly to illustrate the basic problem using de-risking transactions.
One approach to de-risking, recall, occurs when .a plan sponsor
amends a plan to transfer benefit liabilities to an insurance company
that distributes irrevocable annuity contracts to participants."
514. Id. at 1542.
515. Id. at 1551.
516. See supra text accompanying note 159.
517. Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 106 (2007).
518. In Varity, the Court found, or at least arguably found, that misrepresentations in a
plan restructuring were part of the implementation of the plan restructuring. See supra
text accompanying notes at 186-202 (discussing the Varity decision).
519. See supra text accompanying notes 239-43.
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Another involves a plan sponsor's amendment of a plan to allow a
class of participants-generally among those participants who have
already retired but sometimes also including former employees who
have vested benefits-to elect a lump-sum payment in lieu of lifetime
stream of income from the plan.520 Both of these situations pose
challenging implementation questions for a fiduciary, particularly
since the plan sponsor's settlor decisions in a de-risking are largely
antithetical to the interests of the employees. How the courts and the
DOL respond to these issues can either accentuate or minimize the
harms that flow from the settlor decision to de-risk. Similarly, difficult
considerations in application of fiduciary decision making arise in the
context of ESOPs. For example, courts have struggled to define when
payments in the nature of dividends or compensation rise to the level
that they constitute a fiduciary breach.52' This Article leaves those
questions for another day.
3. Limiting ERISA's Preemptive Reach
Finally, returning to the core principle that courts might
constrain the settlor/fiduciary doctrine by considering the doctrine
together with collateral statutory provisions, preemption may play an
important role. This is especially true in the category of concerns we
identified above related to the creation of regulatory voids,
particularly in welfare plans. Again, though, there is a slight twist.
Rather than a substantive ERISA provision limiting the doctrine,
ERISA's preemption provision would permit the application of state
law. This could be most applicable in areas that are core areas of
traditional state regulation, such as the regulation of medical
providers.
In sum, if courts use collateral limitations based in ERISA's
substantive requirements to refine the scope of the settlor/fiduciary
distinction, they will need to develop the case law on those
requirements. And again, the task would not necessarily be an easy
one. It would, however, help prevent plans from undermining ERISA
protections that Congress included in the statute. In fact, statutory
provisions are relevant to all three categories of concerns we
520. Any plan action to reduce its risk is a "de-risking" action. In addition to the two
techniques discussed in the text, plan sponsors may take actions such as changing a plan's
investment strategy, their contribution patterns, etc. DAVID BUCK & JASON FLYNN,
DELOITTE, CFO INSIGHTS: DE-RISKING PENSIONS: CAN IT BE DONE? 2-3 (2013),
available at http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance-
transformation/us-cfo-CFO-Insights-De-risking-pensions-01 172013.pdf.
521. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 280-87.
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identified above in Part III: (1) concerns related to employee
expectations; (2) concerns related to undermining ERISA
protections; and (3) concerns related to the creation of regulatory
voids, particularly in welfare plans.
B. Treating Plan Management Decisions As Fiduciary Decisions
Rather than focusing on collateral limitations to cabin the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine, an alternative approach would be for courts
to acknowledge that some plan design decisions are, in fact, fiduciary
decisions, pulling back from the rhetoric in Spink.522 As we have
already noted, Spink held that plan amendments (and that
presumably extends to plan design decisions in the initial plan
document) are never plan administrative or management decisions
and thus not fiduciary activities.523 But the decision conflates
administrative and management decisions, which are referred to in
separate clauses of the statutory definition of fiduciary and were
almost certainly intended by Congress to have different meanings.
The authors conclude that the idea that plan amendments are not
fiduciary in nature because they do not fit within the statutory
definition of fiduciary administrative decisions does not necessarily
mean that the amendments can never constitute fiduciary plan
management decisions. Early in the last subsection, we described how
collateral limitation could support the Department's position that the
selection of plan investments is always a fiduciary function-
regardless of whether the investment options are included in the
plan's terms.524 Acknowledgement that there is a difference between
administrative and management decisions involving the plan could
support the Department's view that both investment selection and
monitoring are always fiduciary decisions. At one level, we believe
that the Department's position seems inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Hughes that the act of plan amendment is always a
settlor function.525 But the identification of a person as a named
fiduciary in a plan document or the selection of an investment menu
for a participant defined contribution plan are arguably plan
522. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996). For a discussion of the case, see
supra text accompanying notes 129-37.
523. Spink, 517 U.S. at 889-91.
524. See supra text accompanying note 256.
525. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999). For a discussion of the
case, see supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text.
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management decisions, even if implemented through a plan
amendment.52 6
Moreover, the statute provides that exercise of authority or
control over management of plan assets is a fiduciary action, and it is
obvious, at least to these authors, that a plan provision creating a
menu of investment options for a self-directed plan certainly is the
exercise of authority over management of plan assets. There is, then,
a basis for pulling back from the broad statement in Spink, which was
not necessary to the Spink decision and might be considered dicta
rather than the case's holding.527
Consider other situations in which a court might find that a plan
sponsor engages in the exercise of authority or control over
management of plan assets. In de-risking transactions, the plan
sponsor uses its discretion to decide to transfer plan assets to an
annuity provider without terminating the plan.528 When determining
what percentage of a plan's assets to transfer as part of a corporate
reorganization or sale of the unit, the plan sponsor likewise makes a
discretionary decision on transferring assets out of the plan. These
discretionary transfers of plan assets in a context when the plan
continues in existence may have a significant effect on the rights of
participants and the ability of the surviving plan to pay benefits. As
such, these discretionary decisions logically fit within Congress' goal
of ensuring that control over plan assets is subject to ERISA's
fiduciary protections.
526. There are at least two other arguments in favor of the Department's position.
Perhaps a plan sponsor who amends a plan to set the investment menu is a fiduciary
because he "renders investment advice" to the plan, although the statutory framework
making an investment adviser a fiduciary requires that the advice be rendered "for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect," ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii)
(2012), and it is not clear that a plan sponsor receives any sort of compensation for
selecting the plan's investments. Or, perhaps the Department's position can be seen as an
exception-perhaps a singular exception-to the expansive definitional scope that the
Supreme Court has given settlor (and thus nonfiduciary) functions. See, e.g., Hughes, 525
U.S. at 443 (finding that "decision[s] regarding the form or structure of the plan" are
generally settlor functions); Spink, 517 U.S. at 890-91 (holding that employers act as
settlors when they adopt, modify, or terminate welfare benefit or pension plans).
527. The DOL's existing guidance is consistent with this, and it could reiterate that
guidance, which should receive deference from the courts as longstanding and consistent
guidance.
528. The ongoing nature of the plan distinguishes this decision from situations in which
plans are voluntarily or involuntarily terminated. Supreme Court decisions, correctly in
our view, confirm that those plan terminations are settlor decisions. See, e.g., Beck v.
PACE Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007).
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Using this approach, courts could reject the Spink5 29 dicta and
recognize that plan management and control and management of plan
assets are fiduciary acts as defined by the statute. In terms of the
concerns we identified above in Part III, the primary effect would be
to prevent the undermining of ERISA protections in such varied
applications as ensuring the prudence of plan investment menus,
preventing the substitution of non-ERISA annuities for retiree DB
plan benefits, and precluding employers from indirectly capturing the
value of plan assets by inflating the sale price of a unit. In situations
such as de-risking transactions, the authors' position is that
recognizing the fiduciary nature of the decision also will protect
retirees' expectation that their benefits would be paid from the plan
so long as the plan remains in existence.
C. Outcome- Oriented Decision Making
This brings us to a final point: in cases in which the facts are
particularly troubling, the Supreme Court sometimes seems to blunt
the harshest edges of the broad ERISA doctrines it has created. For
example, in its initial interpretations, the Supreme Court used
sweeping language when applying ERISA's preemption provision.3 0
When considering ERISA remedies, the Supreme Court first
appeared to dramatically limit remedies. In more recent cases, the
Court has distinguished those early decisions and permitted remedies
that the lower courts had presumed were foreclosed by the Court's
broad language.532
Of course development over time of increasingly nuanced
doctrine is not unusual in the common law. So, it should not be
surprising either that other areas of ERISA jurisprudence have
developed in this way or that the same effect can be seen in the
settlor/fiduciary cases, especially when application of broadly-written
language would result in particularly harsh outcomes. Thus, the
Court's holding in Varity Corp.-that the employer's
misrepresentations to employees were made while wearing both an
employer hat and a fiduciary hat533-might be explained as the
Court's implicit unwillingness to sanction abhorrent business
behavior. And similarly, the Court's holding in McCutchen-that the
529. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996).
530. See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed
Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251,261-62 (1997).
531. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 304, at 1338-48.
532. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1876, 1879, 1881-82 (2011).
533. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504-06 (1996).
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Court would not interpret plan subrogation language to require a
participant to pay the plan medical expenses gross of lawyers' fees in
the absence of unambiguous plan language so providing 5s-may have
reflected the Court's unease at endorsing an unusually harsh result. In
other words, we might take from Varity Corp. and McCutchen a
lesson that the Court will create ways to bend the settlor/fiduciary
distinction to avoid egregious outcomes.s"5
In our view, it would be preferable for the Court to begin
refurbishing the settlor/fiduciary doctrine so that the Court does not
have to engage in ad-hoc creativity to avoid such outcomes and can
fashion results in other cases that better accommodate and balance
ERISA's sometimes contradictory themes and reflect the underlying
economics of employee benefit plans. In the prior two subparts, we
have offered approaches that courts might use to build a more
nuanced doctrine. The first approach would limit the doctrine
collaterally, relying on substantive ERISA provisions. The second
would recognize that in Spink the Supreme Court was opining only on
the "administration" prong of ERISA's fiduciary definition."' That
leaves courts free to recognize that decisions on plan management or
the control or management of plan assets are, as defined in the
statute, fiduciary in nature.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps in a jurisprudence with a greater tilt toward legislative
intent than our own (and an affinity for both whimsy and deus ex
machina), every statute would have an expiration date (say forty
years) that coincides with a reunion of the legislators who enacted it
and the staff who wrote it, who would then have a free hand to
address the statute's unintended consequences and to correct judicial
and administrative distortions of what they had in mind (or what they
would have had in mind had they been able to chart future events
with unerring accuracy). ERISA is certainly a statute that has been
victimized both by unintended consequences and by judicial and
administrative distortion of legislative intent and statutory purpose
and meaning (assuming, of course, that the legislators had a uniform
understanding of what they were attempting to achieve, a fiction in
534. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1547-48 (2013).
535. We suspect, though, that many plans will be amended to provide precisely the
harsh result that we speculate the Court, sub silentio, may have been trying to avoid.
536. See supra text accompanying notes 129-37 for a discussion of Spink.
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which lawyers reflexively engage). Nowhere has this victimization
been more dramatic than with the fiduciary/settlor doctrine.
We have shown in this Article instances where the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine has produced troubling outcomes and have
predicted that the broad berth the courts have given the doctrine, if
left unchecked, will lead to even more disturbing outcomes in the
future. Indeed, in the course of working on this Article, we twice had
to move a discussion of predicted outcomes to a discussion of settled
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Why did the doctrine develop as it did? Here our story is, of
course, a bit speculative. When first formulated, the doctrine
provided a sensible approach to recognizing the plan sponsor's
economic interest in the plan, something that a literal application of
the statute's fiduciary standards might have prevented. But the
doctrine was not well theorized, and the Supreme Court's decision to
locate its core in explicit statutory language rather than in a federal
common law created doctrinal rigidity where doctrinal flexibility
might have been preferable. The Court, deciding one case at a time
and relying on the ease with which the doctrine leads to outcome, and
without ever fully reflecting on how the doctrine might affect future
application of the statute, seeded the doctrine into ERISA's statutory
language and we now seem stuck with what the Court has sown.
Or are we? We have suggested ways that the Supreme Court
might retreat a bit from the doctrine, but we also recognize that rote
judicial adherence to the doctrine over time has made retreat more
difficult. Perhaps we will have to rely on Congress to legislate limits
on the doctrine. But perhaps more judicial focus on and discussion of
contexts broader than particular cases is yet possible. Indeed, we
wrote this Article to help stimulate such a discussion, for hope springs
eternal, even among those of us who write and think about ERISA.
537. See, e.g., supra note 267.
2015] 549
550 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93
